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 This study analyzes the activities of the organized 
crime groups involved in the drug business, as well as 
examining national and international efforts to control 
these groups. Specifically, this study addresses the 
following questions: How is organized crime connected to 
the international drug business?; What are the major 
transnational organized crime groups involved in the 
international drug business?; What is the nature of the 
drug problem as it relates to organized crime 
internationally?; What international cooperative law 
enforcement efforts currently exist to deal with organized 
crime and the drug business? Findings indicate that efforts 
to create an effective international law enforcement 
network are needed to meet the challenges of drug 
trafficking and globalized crime. To date, such efforts 
have largely been unsuccessful. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The globalization of organized crime is an objective 
and documented fact (Keohane, 2001). The proliferation of 
transnational crime has become fairly common, and can be 
observed in every developed or developing nation. Though 
the origins of organized crime can be traced back hundreds 
of years, the changes that have occurred in the past few 
decades as a result of globalization are remarkably unique 
and important. Equally important are the effects these 
changes have had on organized crime as it relates to drug 
and narcotics trafficking.  
As a result of globalization, the activities of 
criminals today supercede national boundaries. Developments 
in global transportation and communication have given 
criminals the opportunity to shift people, money and 
contraband across national borders with more ease than ever 
before. The nations of the world have responded to this 
emerging problem in their own separate ways. The resulting 
lack of a unified front has presented an advantage to 
organized international drug trafficking. With the onset of 
globalization, the danger of the drug business is now an 
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international problem and, as such, the response to it also 
needs to be international. In order to face up to the 
issue, it is very important for world governments to 
become as systematic and efficient as the drug traffickers 
and crime organizations have become. 
Today's international criminal organizations are 
dynamic, complicated, tremendously opportunist, and 
submerged in a vast array of illegal and legal activities. 
This study will attempt to analyze the activities of the 
organized crime groups that are involved in the drug 
business. It will also attempt to evaluate national and 
international efforts to control these organized crime 
groups. The first chapter of this study will consist of a 
review of the literature related to organized crime and the 
illicit drug trade. It will also contain an exploration of 
international and regional efforts to eradicate organized 
crime. Afterwards, the motivation behind this study will be 
discussed, and its scope, research questions, limitations, 
and methodology will be outlined. 
The Illicit Drug Problem and Organized Crime 
The illicit drug trade is one of the most important 
problems affecting the United States (US) as well as the 
entire world. It touches millions and perhaps billions of 
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lives around the globe. According to United Nations (UN) 
estimates, 180 million people consumed drugs in the late 
1990s. This 180 million includes 144 million cannabis 
consumers, 29 million amphetamine-type consumers, 14 
million cocaine users, 13 million opiate users and 9 
million heroin abusers (Calvani, 2001).   
Drugs are not a local problem. Today, illicit drugs 
manufactured in the “golden crescent” countries including 
Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, are mostly consumed in 
Europe and the United States. The drug business is not 
confined to national territories. It is a transnational 
business (Akida, 1997; Bequai, 1979; Collison, 1995; Duyne, 
1996; Griffith, 2000; Tullis, 1995; United Nations, 
Economic Dimensions, 1998).  
The drug trade is made up of several parts. First, 
drugs must be grown or the raw materials must be bought. 
Then the drugs must be sent to chemical labs for 
refinement. The drugs must be shipped later across national 
borders to finally be sold on the streets (Duyne, 1996). It 
is almost impossible for one individual alone to carry out 
all these tasks: the drug business requires coordination 
and planning. It is truly an organized criminal business 
(Cerny, 1995; Rosenau, 1992).  
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In the last decades of the twentieth century, 
organized criminal groups exploited the economic 
liberalization and open borders that gave rise to 
multinational corporations. They have exploited the 
opportunities of globalization. Therefore organized crime 
demands international concern (Strange, 1996).  
Organized crime groups have found their work made 
easier due to the lack of an effective law enforcement, the 
lack of an effective criminal justice system, and the lack 
of effective extradition practices in many countries. In 
order for transnational crime to exist, it must elude 
national law enforcement. Foreign jurisdictions have become 
safe places and borders are used as fences to hide behind 
(Dorn, 1996). Organized crime groups engage in legitimate 
business as well as illegitimate business. Sometimes the 
illegitimate business nests itself inside a larger 
legitimate business; sometimes it controls the legitimate 
business. As a result, the line between the illegitimate 
and legitimate business is blurred. This makes the 
detection and neutralization of the activities of organized 
criminals difficult (Duyne, 1996). The situation becomes 
more complex when actual government entities become 
involved in the business of organized crime. The downfall 
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of a formerly totalitarian state provides the opportunity 
for its government officials to engage in organized crime. 
For example, the collapse of Soviet Union provided the 
opportunity for some to smuggle nuclear materials out of 
the military stocks of the former Soviet Union (Albini, 
Rogers, & Anderson, 1999; Hersh, 1994). The involvement of 
former and current government officials in organized crime 
has made organized criminal groups, in certain cases, able 
to outsmart the police because they have better equipment, 
and better resources, and they do not operate within the 
framework of the rule of law (Viviano, 1999; Campbell, 
1998). 
Organized crime has significant economic and political 
consequences. The black market economy of organized crime 
brings rapid unprecedented change to the distribution of 
wealth in a society, thereby destroying its social fabric 
and economic structure (Johnson, 1985; Ouazzani, 1996). The 
profits of the organized crime business, mainly gained 
through the sale of drugs, are used to support separatist 
and terrorist groups that aim to undermine the states. 
Consequently, organized crime upsets the political 
stability of some countries, including Turkey, Peru, Sri 
Lanka, Afghanistan, Ireland and so many others. Similarly, 
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it is not surprising that in the last fifty years there has 
been almost a continuous unrest in Colombia and 
Afghanistan, both major opium manufacturing countries 
(Chalk, 2000; Nakamura, 1999; Silke, 2000; Tammen, 1991; 
Solinge, 1998).  
International and Regional Efforts To Eradicate Organized 
Crime 
The involvement of transnational elements in a crime 
makes the successful prosecution of organized crime 
difficult. When a crime is committed in different 
jurisdictions, the criminals can only be prosecuted 
successfully when all parts of their activities are 
interlinked. This requires international cooperation at the 
legislative, judicial and executive levels. In the current 
international arena, this type of cooperation is met with 
many obstacles. The corruption of some governmental 
agencies, differing legal systems, varied laws, lack of 
resources, and lack of a common language, all get in the 
way of effective international cooperation (Boer, 1999). 
On the other hand, many countries throughout the world 
have realized the importance of international cooperation 
and have come together to effectively combat organized 
crime. There are many bilateral, multilateral and 
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international cooperation agreements. The United Nations 
and the European Union have done a great deal to promote 
such cooperation. The United Nations Congress on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice was among the first of the 
United Nations initiatives (Steffens, 1990). This Congress 
meets once every five years. To date, they have met ten 
times.  
In 1989, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was 
formed at the G-7 Economic Summit. The recommendations 
promulgated by the FATF encouraged governments to improve 
international cooperation through the exchange of 
information, legislative harmonization, and bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, such as the Council of Europe 
Laundering Convention (Savona, 1996). In 1998, the United 
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was held (Kellman et al., 
1996). In 1994, the United Nations’s Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Branch arranged the "International 
Conference on Preventing and Controlling Money Laundering 
and the Use of the Proceeds of Crime: A Global Approach" at 
Courmayeur in Italy. In 1997, the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) signed the Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
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International Business Transactions (Financial Crimes, 
1996; Sterling, 1994b; United Nations, Convention Against, 
1998). The countries that signed the OECD's Anti-Bribery 
Convention also agreed to the Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption (Zagaris, & Ohri, 1999).  
The United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, adopted by the General Assembly at its 
meeting in November of 2000, made great strides towards 
international cooperation. The Convention, simply called 
the Palermo Convention, aimed “to promote cooperation to 
prevent and combat transnational organized crime more 
effectively” (United Nations, General Assembly, 2000). The 
Palermo Convention was opened for signature at a conference 
in Palermo, Italy, on December 12-15, 2001. The Palermo 
Convention was the first legal binding United Nations 
instrument in the field of crime. It was the first 
convention signed by 124 countries just after its opening 
to signatures. No United Nations Convention had ever 
received so many signatories upon its opening for 
signatures in less than a month after its adoption by the 
General Assembly.  
In addition to efforts at the international level, 
efforts were made at the regional level to combat organized 
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crime. In Europe, the Conventions on Extradition (1957), 
the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959), the 
International Validity of Criminal Judgments (1970), and 
the Transfer of Criminal Proceedings (1972) were held. In 
1988, the Basel Declaration of Principles, was agreed upon, 
affecting the central banks in twelve countries. In 1991, 
the European Community agreed on the Directive on 
Prevention of Use of the Financial System for the Purpose 
of Money Laundering. Furthermore, in 1991, the European 
Council held a convention on Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (Council of Europe, 
Convention on Laundering, 1991). In Europe, efforts to 
combat organized crime have been supported by the works of 
the Trevi Group, Maastricht Treaty, and Schengen 
Convention. For example, Europol was established in 
accordance with the directives of the Trevi Group; Article 
K of the Maastricht Treaty requires signatories for 
cooperation in law enforcement matters; the Schengen 
Convention regulates cross-border pursuit and information 
sharing by the police forces of different countries 
(Klosek, 1999).  
The regions outside of Europe have not produced any 
large-scale multilateral arrangements to combat organized 
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crime comparable to those made in Europe. Lesser 
arrangements have been made outside the European continent 
among the Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission (CICAD) of 
the Organization of American States (OAS), the Caribbean 
Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and in the League of 
Arab States (Williams, 1996).  
Zagaris argues that regional efforts in the Americas 
are modeled after the European experience and are gradually 
approaching an overall, hemispheric framework (Zagaris, 
1996). Nichols has suggested the formation of an "Americas 
Committee," modeled after the European Committee on Crime 
Problems, to review existing legislation, suggest legal 
measures, draft legislation, and move the region toward 
harmonization (Nichols, 1999) 
Kovaleski and his coauthors state that, Caribbean 
countries have very actively strived to achieve regional 
cooperation, and they actively seek assistance to combat 
organized crime, even though such efforts require some sort 
of sacrifice, such as giving up some sovereignty in their 
countries (Kovaleski et al., 1998). In addition to these 
international crime conventions, Interpol and Europol were 
founded. Interpol short for “international police” was 
founded in 1923 to coordinate the efforts of domestic law 
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enforcement agencies in countries, and to foster the 
exchange of information between them (Abadinsky, 1990; 
Kellman et al., 1996). Europol, assuming the role of its 
predecessor the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU), was formed in 
1998 (Boer, 1999; Bremner, 1995; Monaco, 1998).  
In order to fight organized crime at both national and 
international levels, it is important not only to develop 
very strong criminal and judicial systems in countries that 
are subject to organized criminal activities, but also to 
make every attempt to seal legal loopholes within these 
systems. Organized crime units have a tendency to base 
their actions in countries that have particularly 
vulnerable judicial and law enforcement systems. It is 
therefore necessary to make every effort to support 
developing countries and help strengthen their legal and 
judicial systems. Chapter Four of this study will provide a 
detailed overview of  current international and American 
regulations that are intended to address the problem of 
organized crime, and will analyze the inadequacies inherent 
in these programs.  
Motivation and Scope of the Present Study 
Despite the efforts that have been made on national 
and international levels to reduce organized criminal 
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activities in general, the drug problem, assumably a 
corollary to organized crime, still exists in incredible 
dimensions. Despite the fact that more resources are 
dedicated to the eradication of the drug problem each year, 
consumption levels are still rising all over the world 
(Calvani, 2001). The failure of drug control strategies is 
the major motivation behind the present study. 
Consequently, the scope of this study is to examine 
existing drug control strategies and some of their effects.  
Research Questions 
This research will primarily attempt to answer the 
following question: How is organized crime connected to the 
international drug business?  To answer this primary 
research question, the following analysis questions have 
been identified: What are the major transnational organized 
crime groups involved in the international drug business? 
What is the nature of the drug problem as it relates to 
organized crime internationally? Finally, what 
international cooperative law enforcement efforts currently 
exist to deal with organized crime and the drug business? 
Limitations 
There is no universally accepted definition of 
organized crime. This lack of a concrete definition 
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presents a problem for the researcher taking into 
consideration the fact that every study should start with a 
clear definition of the concepts under focus. The fact that 
there is no consensus on the legality or illegality of 
drugs constitutes another problem.  
The political economy of organized crime has proven to 
be very hard to investigate due to the secrecy of the 
participants and of the activity itself. Several estimates 
attempt to gauge the supply and the demand of the goods and 
services in illegal circulation, it is almost impossible to 
develop statistics about the overhead extracted from these 
activities. Without having these numbers, it is difficult 
to measure the direct and indirect effects that the 
proceeds of these illegal activities have on domestic and 
international political economies. The social cost of 
organized criminal activity is more visible. For example, 
increases in drug-related crimes can be measured. However, 
there is no way to fully measure the social costs of 
organized crime. In sum, observation, data collection and 
measurement problems seriously affect the credibility of 
scientific research in this area. 
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Methodology 
In this thesis, a policy research approach will be 
used to analyze both formal and informal sources of 
information. Formal sources are defined as articles from 
scholarly journals, laws, statutes, and administrative 
reports. Informal sources include newspaper articles, and 
websites. 
Policy research is defined as the process of 
conducting research on a fundamental social problem to find 
the causes of the problem and to make recommendations 
(Majchrzak, 1984). This particular study will focus more 
heavily on the identification of the problem rather than 
recommendation of solutions. In order to intelligently 
recommend solutions to the problems identified in this 
study, more research, and a greater consideration of all 
relevant variables would be necessary to, in essence, 
provide a comprehensive drug and organized crime control 
strategy. This type of analysis must take into 
consideration the social, political, economic, and cultural 
dimensions of the proposed policy, and is perhaps best left 
to the research teams of national and international 
organizations. This policy research will then primarily 
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focus on describing the problem, serving an “enlightment 
function” as described by Weiss (1997). 
The present study will consist of three stages: 
preparation, data collection, and conceptualization. In the 
preparation and data collection phases of the study, basic 
information will be presented regarding international 
organized crime and the illicit drug trade. Efforts to 
combat drugs at the international and regional level will 
be explored with caution. In preparation for this study, 
first, Abadinsky’s book, Organized Crime will be 
overviewed. Next, the data collection stage will start. 
Qualitative data will be collected, including information 
about the conceptualization of organized crime, illicit 
drugs, and drug control agreements. The data will be 
collected from books, and articles published in scholarly 
journals. Academic books and portions of books both printed 
and/or online are appropriate resources for this type of 
research. In addition to these publications, articles 
related to the topic and various Internet resources will be 
used in order to gather a wide variety of the most up-to-
date information available about organized crime.  
Several keyword searches will be used for this 
research, including “organized crime,” “international 
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organized crime,” “organized crime related issues,” 
“international efforts towards organized crime,” “organized 
crime and drugs,” “illicit drug business,” and “definition 
of organized crime.” In order to focus on only the most 
relevant information, articles and books written about the 
specific field of organized crime will be covered. Within 
the field of organized crime, specific terms such as 
“definition of organized crime,” or “major organized crime 
groups” will be searched. In addition, the reports of the 
United Nations will be collected. 
The data collection stage will be followed by the 
conceptualization of organized crime. This stage will 
specify how the term will be used in this study. Working 
definitions of organized and international organized crime 
will be attempted, and international criminal organizations 
will be identified. The content and scope of their 
operations will subsequently be outlined. This study will 
focus on the drug-related aspects of organized crime. The 
characteristics of the drug trafficking business both on 
domestic and international levels will be outlined, with 
special attention being given to their repercussions on 
national and international economies and policies. 
Throughout the course of this conceptualization process, it 
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will be difficult to formulate definitions because of the 
complexity of the issues and concepts involved. Typologies 
are often used when trying to understand complex terms. 
They outline several dimensions of a particular concept. 
Some definitions of organized crime and the drug business 
are overbroad and do little to explain the characteristics 
of organized crime. Some definitions and statements focus 
on a single aspect of organized crime, while others unite a 
number of characteristics into a multi-dimensional concept 
of organized crime. Overall, most organized crime 
definitions state that organized crime is rationally 
designed, violent, and powerful (Kovaleski et al., 1998). 
No study of drug-related organized crime would be complete 
without analyzing national and international level 
eradication efforts. An overall assessment of the nature of 
domestic, bilateral and multilateral efforts will comprise 
the final section of this research.  
Summary and Overview of Following Chapters 
This study consists of five chapters. The Chapter One 
provides an introduction to the nature of organized crime 
and illicit drugs. It states that organized criminal 
activities go beyond national borders. Consequently, 
worldwide deterrence mechanisms must be supported. In order 
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to fight organized crime at both the national and 
international level, the criminal and judicial systems of 
countries that are susceptible to organized criminal 
activities must be made extremely strong, and every attempt 
must be made to seal legal loopholes by way of 
international judicial and law enforcement collaboration. 
Due to the fact that organized crime groups have a tendency 
to establish bases in countries that have vulnerable 
judicial and law enforcement systems, efforts must be made 
to support these countries by strengthening their 
vulnerable legal and judicial systems. 
The Chapter Two of this study provides a comprehensive 
definition of organized crime and an overview of the “Big 
Five” international criminal organizations that identify 
their major activities. These criminal organizations take 
advantage of the swiftness and ease of international 
travel, the development of free trade, high technology 
communications and sophisticated money laundering 
techniques to further their criminal efforts. The Chapter 
Two emphasizes the fact that international organized crime 
is an urgent and rising problem, one that should cause 
concern in the international law enforcement community. 
International organized criminal activities pose a threat 
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to the three pillars of state sovereignty. Namely, states 
should have control of their borders, a monopoly on the use 
of violence for enforcement, and the power to tax the 
economic activities that occur within state borders 
(Zagaris, 1996) International criminal organizations pose 
as an alternative to legitimate state power, thereby 
undermining stability and state control. Their espousal of 
corruption in government threatens the development of 
democracy in many countries around the world. 
International organized crime groups are engaged in 
numerous criminal activities. These activities include 
supporting of terrorist groups, extortion, corruption, 
bribery, drug trafficking, money laundering, kidnapping, 
prostitution, arms smuggling, and alien smuggling. The 
extensive political, economic, social and technological 
advances that have occurred in the last two decades have 
enabled crime groups around the world to progressively 
become more dynamic. The capability of international 
organized crime groups to settle in to these enormous 
changes has held back law enforcement efforts against them. 
In the Chapter Three of this study, the illicit drug 
crime will be identified by outlining the characteristics 
of the drug business, exploring the theoretical framework 
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of drug abuse, and identifying the political and economic 
aspects of the drug business. Chapter three states that 
drug crime is a destabilizing force and can ruin global 
peace and security.  
The Chapter Four will contain a systematic exploration 
and analysis of the international efforts that have been 
made to eradicate the drug business in criminal 
organizations and provide an overview of the current 
international and American regulations that address the 
problem of organized crime and it inherent corollaries. 
The Chapter Five will explore the problems associated 
with current strategies to combat drugs. The problems 
caused by organized criminals are no longer confined to 
countries where those criminal groups are headquartered and 
these organized criminal groups have increasingly become 
more sophisticated. They have used profits, power, and 
influence to insulate and protect their structure from 





IDENTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 
Defining Organized Crime 
This chapter will provide a comprehensive definition 
of organized crime. It will identify several major 
international criminal organizations, and will outline 
their major activities. Organized crime is a broad concept. 
Consequently, it is hard to find a definition that 
encompasses every aspect of international organized crime. 
Accordingly, different stakeholders define organized crime 
differently. In fact, there are two major groups that 
attempt to define organized crime: governmental entities, 
including law enforcement agencies, and criminologists. 
Definitions of Organized Crime by the Governmental Entities 
 Law enforcement agencies have made several attempts to 
define organized crime. In 1950, the Kefauver Committee, 
the committee that uncovered the existence of the Mafia, an 
international criminal organization, noted that the Mafia 
had branches in many American cities. Furthermore, in 1967, 
the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice noted that the Mafia had a highly 
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centralized structure, and that “leadership appears to be 
in a group rather than a single individual” (President’s 
Commission, 1967a, p. 1). In the 1960s, the Oyster Bay 
Conferences defined organized crime as: 
“the product of self-perpetuating criminal conspiracy 
to wring exorbitant profits from our society by any 
means –fair and foul, legal and illegal … It survives 
on fear and corruption … It is totalitarian 
organization … it imposes rigid discipline on 
underlings who do the dirty work while the top men … 
are generally insulated from the criminal act” 
(Bequai, 1979, p.3). 
This definition compares organized criminal groups to 
totalitarian regimes because of their highly centralized 
structure and the way they use force to keep their members 
in line. 
In 1967, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice defined organized crime as a 
society seeking to operate outside of the government. It 
involves thousands of members working within a structure 
similar to the structure of any large corporation 
(President’s Commission, 1967a). J. Edgar Hoover defined 
organized crime as a very closely organized and strictly 
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disciplined organization acting on a nationwide basis with 
international implications (President’s Commission, 1967b). 
 The Arizona Organized Crime Project defined organized 
crime as: 
“(T)he conduct of an organized criminal syndicate or 
syndicates which are characterized by a conspiratorial plan 
to commit or the commission of crimes of force, fraud, 
corruption, vice or racketeering when the primary 
motivation for such conduct is the acquisition and 
maintenance of profit or power” (Edelhertz, Cole, & Berk, 
1983, p.11) 
Former FBI Director Louis Freeh, in a Senate Hearing 
on International Crime, said “We view organized crime as a 
continuing criminal conspiracy having a firm organizational 
structure, a conspiracy fed by fear and corruption” 
(Rawlinson, 1998). 
 In the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, organized 
crime was defined as “the unlawful activities of the 
members of a highly organized, disciplined association 
engaged in supplying illegal goods and services, including 
but not limited to gambling, prostitution, loansharking, 
narcotics, labor racketeering, and other unlawful 
activities of the members of such organizations.” 
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In the Canadian Criminal Code, organized crime is 
defined as a crime committed by any group, association or 
other body consisting of five or more persons, whether 
formally or informally organized, having as one of its 
primary activities the commission of an indictable offense 
for which the maximum punishment is imprisonment for five 
years or more (Canada Criminal, 1985). 
Definitions of Organized Crime by Criminologists 
 Edwin Sutherland saw organized crime as a social 
parasite that grew in the absence of a strong government. 
In Sutherland’s view, a criminal organization is 
characterized by a division of labor, certain established 
territories, and the selection of leadership from its own 
ranks. Sutherland found that criminality permeated 
organized crime groups. Criminal activities are usually 
unpunished, mostly deliberate, and they often involve the 
connivance of government officials (Sutherland, 1949). 
Some criminologists liken the criminal organization to 
a corporation. Both have a ruling body. Both exist despite 
the changes in leadership positions. And, both interact 
with other corporations / criminal organizations (Bequai, 
1979). On the other hand, the corporate model has been 
criticized by criminologists who see the crime 
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organizations as social systems. According to this theory, 
organized crime is a social system containing 
interrelationships based on social bonds among the members. 
In contrast to a corporate structure, which lacks 
flexibility, organized crime, according to the social model 
is a living and adaptive structure. 
A third group of criminologists, influenced by 
Marxism, see organized crime as part of a class struggle 
(Bequai, 1979). This third group is concerned with the 
dynamics of classes, their means and ends. The means or 
methods are various crimes including theft, vandalism, and 
so forth, and the ends, or objectives, are power and wealth 
(Abadinsky, 1990).   
Attributes of Organized Crime and Defining International 
Organized Crime 
Since there is no unique definition of organized 
crime, some of its attributes have been identified by law 
enforcement agencies and researchers. An understanding of 
these attributes will facilitate an understanding of 
organized crime as itself. Several criminal justice 
scholars assert that, organized crime has several 
identifiable characteristics that distinguish it from 
everyday crimes or similar looking illegal networks. To 
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begin with, organized crime has no political agenda, a fact 
which distinguishes it from terrorism. It has a 
hierarchical and monopolistic structure, unlike “everyday” 
crime. The term “hierarchical structure” refers to the 
existence of a vertical power establishment in the group. 
It is monopolistic because it does not like competition,  
favoring a strict control over certain legal and illegal 
businesses within a specific geographical area. Violence 
and bribery are frequently employed to ensure control over 
the market. A carefully elaborated division of labor and 
strictly regulated membership procedures are worth 
mentioning as well. Personnel recruitment is especially 
important due to the clandestine and illegal nature of the 
business. As a consequence, it is not surprising that most 
prominent organized criminal organizations are named after 
the ethnical origins of their members. Organized crime 
groups are often composed of persons of the same national 
origin and even of the same family to ensure loyalty among 
members (Abadinsky, 1990; Gilinsky, 1999; Volobuev. 1990). 
The European Union (EU) Trevi Working Group on Serious 
and Organized Crime lists a number of attributes to 
determine whether a criminal group is an organized crime 
group. It defines an organized crime group as a cooperative 
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structure made up of more than two persons who have been 
together for a long or indefinite period time, who have 
developed a formal discipline and control systems, and who 
are suspected of serious crimes. Other common 
characteristics of organized crime groups include the 
employment of intimidation in their chosen legal or illegal 
markets and finally laundering of the proceedings derived 
of their “business” activities, various degrees of 
influence on either politics, the media, or the criminal 
justice system to maximize profits. In addition, organized 
crime groups tend to expand their activities, eventually 
becoming international criminal group. In line with this 
argument, in order for a criminal group to be qualified as 
an “organized” crime group, it must at minimum be some type 
of organized or cooperative structure made up of more than 
two persons, that has been around for a long or indefinite 
period time. It must be and suspected of serious crimes 
with the purpose of gaining profit and/or power. Going one 
step further, for an organized group to be an 
“international” organized crime organization it should 
possess considerable resources, and its involvement in 
criminal operations should cross state boundaries, often in 
response to a demand for goods that are illegal (Guymon, 
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2000). A crime or criminal group is defined as a form of 
organized crime if at least six of these characteristics 
are applicable (Boer, 1999). There is enough evidence to 
support the contention that the power and wealth of 
organized criminal groups operating in a long list of 
countries is on the rise, and transnational ties among 
these groups are strengthening (Guymon, 2000). 
Consequently, international organized crime is defined 
as the profit-aimed network of activities of the members of 
a non-ideological, highly organized, disciplined, 
monopolistic, and perpetuitous, exclusive association. This 
association which has a division of labor, a capacity for 
ruthless violence, corrupts governmental entities and 
leaders, and cuts across international borders, to engage 
in legitimate or shady deals to provide illegal “goods”, 
including drugs, sex, gambling and so forth (Abadinsky, 
1990; Cole, & Smith, 2001; Guymon, 2000; The Organized 
Crime, 1970). 
 The Major International Criminal Organizations 
The “Big Five” international criminal organizations 
are the Russian “Mafiya,” the Italian mafia families, the 
Colombian cartels, the Chinese Triads, and the Japanese 
Yakuza. In this section, these five groups will be 
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explored. International criminal organizations operate more 
or less in every region of the world. However, some regions 
are more strongly affected by them than others, and some 
groups are more dominant than others. Major crime 
organizations have operated in Russia, Europe, Asia, North 
America and South America. The crime groups operating in 
these areas, known as the “Big Five” were chosen for this 
study because they are highly organized, they function 
internationally, and they have the resources to divide the 
various parts of the world between themselves for their 
specific criminal activities.  
Russian “Mafiya” 
While Russian criminals are relative newcomers to the 
West and are not as numerous in the United States as other 
criminal groups, the Russians stand out among their 
peers.They are talented enough and frightening enough to 
have achieved in two or three years what other 
organizations achieved in twenty or a hundred. History 
provides no better example of the “robbers’ state” than 
Russia in the post-Soviet era. The rapid rise to power of 
Russian organized crime throughout the world has led the 
head of Italy's Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission to 
pronounce in 1993 that the world capital of organized crime 
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is Russia, dispelling any lingering notion that the 
Italians still play the central role (Grigg, 1996). Russian 
criminal organizations have surpassed Colombian drug 
cartels, the Chinese Triads, and various branches of the 
Italian mafia (Williams, 1999). The Russian mafia is 
relatively higher structured, predatory, ruthless, 
skillful, and successful criminal organization (Williams, 
1999).    
Russia is particularly susceptible to flourishing 
criminal activity because of the weakness of its 
government. In an April 1994 interview published in the 
International Herald Tribune, Georgian mafia leader Otari 
Kvantrishvili stated, “They write that I am the mafia’s 
godfather. It was Vladimir Lenin who was the real organizer 
of the mafia and who set up the criminal state” (Grigg, 
1996). On the other hand, Albini and his coauthors suggest 
that the currently prevalent belief that organized crime in 
Russia did not exist until the collapse of the Soviet Union 
uncorrect (Albini et al., 1999). This assertion is 
supported by the statements of some former Soviet Union 
leaders who have argued that the mafia is the end product 
of Communism, and that current mafia activities are 
controlled by the KGB (Grigg, 1996). 
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Despite the fact that it has existed since Russia 
herself was born, Russian organized crime has proliferated 
in the last two decades. According to Handelman, the 
Russian Mafia has proliferated for two reasons. First, from 
the beginnings of +perestroika, law enforcement did not 
assume any responsibility for protecting private enterprise 
because they supposed that the private industry was somehow 
illegitimate in a communist state. Consequently, the police 
stayed away from businesses and offered them no help. 
Second, the Russian people understood democracy as “being 
able to do whatever they wanted” (Handelman, 1993). 
Furthermore, when the police started to include private 
businesses in their jurisdiction, they realized that they 
did not have enough resources. In fact, the inability of 
police to obtain adequate funding, equipment, training, and 
the legal authority to pursue criminals and has exacerbated 
the problems produced by organized crime in Russia 
(Volobuev, 1990).  
In contrast to the arguments of Handelman, Albini and 
his coauthors have argued that although perestroika and 
glasnost have had significant effects on the proliferation 
of the Russian mafia, the “patron-client” nature of crime 
in the Soviet Union was alive and well before perestroika 
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and glasnost (Albini et al., 1999). According to Rawlinson 
the proliferation of the Russian mafia can be explained by 
a supply and demand reality. In fact, the demand of Western 
countries on the one side, and the poverty of the Russian 
people on the other side has contributed greatly to the 
proliferation of Russian organized crime (Rawlinson, 1998).   
Described as “The world’s largest, busiest, and 
possibly meanest collection of organized hoods,” the Mafiya 
includes as many as three million members organized into 
8,000 groups. Two hundred of these groups operate outside 
Russia in fifty separate countries (The Center for 
Strategic, 1997; Williams, 1996). The Russian mafia 
operates mainly in Germany, Poland, and almost every other 
state in Eastern and Central Europe. There is also a 
growing problem of organized criminal networks among Soviet 
émigrés in the United States and Israel (Albanese, 2001).  
In terms of its organizational structure, the Russian 
brand of organized crime deviates slightly from the norm. 
Unlike the Sicilians, the Russians are not necessarily 
organized around family ties, ethnicity, or a centralized 
command (The Center for Strategic, 1997). Indeed, some have 
disputed whether the Russian groups possess the unified, 
hierarchical structure that distinguishes organized crime 
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(Serio, 1992). There does not appear to be an “overall 
controlling figure or body” (William, 1999). Rather, the 
Russian Mafiya has its “godfathers” - called vory v zakone, 
“thieves within the code” or “thieves in law”, who act as 
commanders and strategists in the various countries 
(Handelman, 1993; Sterling, 1994b; The Center for 
Strategic, 1997). A small number of these vory v zakone are 
believed to “loosely rule the Russian criminal world,” and 
meet from time to time to plot (Abramovsky, 1996). In 
addition to the vory, modern organized crime groups in 
Russia have coalesced around three other “centers” of 
criminality: former members of the Soviet power elite, or 
nomenklatura; certain national and ethnic groups such as 
the Chechens; and “criminal associations based on the 
control of a particular geographical sector, a specific 
criminal activity, shared experiences, membership in 
certain athletic sports clubs, or a particular leader” 
countries (The Center for Strategic, 1997). “What does not 
seem to be in dispute, however, is that groups do actively 
cooperate among themselves when necessary .... Current 
levels of 'organization' allow for the merging of 
activities in the criminal and economic spheres” (Serio, 
1992). 
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The Russian Mafiya is a diversified business. Mafiya 
groups are engaged in “extortion, theft, forgery, armed 
assault, contract killing, swindling, drug-running, arms 
smuggling, prostitution, gambling, loan-sharking, 
embezzling, money laundering, and black marketing – all  
this on a monumental and increasingly international scale.” 
Additional activities include “systematic racketeering ... 
trafficking in radioactive material ... and the 
infiltration and purchase of Russian banks.” Unlike the 
Colombians, whose only business is drugs, the Russian 
Mafiya traffics in anything and everything: drugs, metals, 
weapons, nuclear materials – even body parts (The Center 
for Strategic, 1997). 
If any single characteristic sets the Russian 
criminals apart from other organizations, it is probably 
their knack for business and economic crimes, including 
financial fraud and money laundering, both at home and 
abroad (Moody, 1996). The crowning achievement of Russian 
organized crime in the post-cold war era was the massive 
plundering of currency and national resources from the 
former Soviet Union. Currently, organized crime groups 
control or influence most private banks and an alarming 
number of businesses within the former Soviet Union. 
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According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, more 
than half of all banks, forty percent of all private 
businesses, and sixty percent of all state-owned businesses 
are controlled by Russian organized crime (Goldman, 1996; 
Hersh, 1994). The Russian mafia controls 40,000 privatized 
industries and collects protection money from eighty 
percent of the banks and private industries in Russia 
(Sterling, 1994b). 
In sum, roughly sixty-five percent of the Russian 
economy is governed by organized criminal groups. The 
Russian Mafiya has also achieved a remarkable level of 
control over government officials since the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, and it has the potential to achieve the same 
level of corruption as the Colombians have achieved in 
their home state. An estimated twenty-five percent of 
criminal proceeds in Russia are invested in maintaining and 
increasing ties with corrupt officials (Abramovsky, 1996; 
Lutwak, 1996; The Center for Strategic, 1997). 
The development of international operations by the 
Russian Mafiya was facilitated by the presence of Red Army 
troops in large immigrant communities abroad. In Germany, 
the mafiya’s activities include trafficking in drugs, 
weapons, radioactive materials, and stolen cars, as well as 
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money laundering and blackmail. Red Army troops stranded in 
Germany at the end of the Cold War not only provided a 
distribution network, they also had a willingness to sell 
weapons and other goods, effectively joining the ranks of 
the criminals. In addition to their contacts in Germany, 
the Russian mafiya has ties to the American and Sicilian 
mafias (Sterling, 1994b). 
 The corruption of law enforcement officials assigned 
to stem the narcotics trade is common. However, the Russian 
police officers rarely become leaders of the Russian 
narcomafia (Gilinskiy, 1999). On the other hand, it is not 
rare for the Russian police officers to be low level 
functionaries in the drug business, or to be consumers 
(Gilinskiy, 1999).   
Italian Mafia 
The Italian mafia has been famous both in Italy and 
the United States. In fact, La Cosa Nostra was initiated by 
Sicillian immigrants in the United States. Despite the 
traditionally distrustful relationship between the American 
and Sicillian Mafias, the relationship between them has 
evolved into one of mutual prosperity (Sterling, 1994a). In 
the United States, both Big Paul Castelleno and Aniello 
Dellacroce were involved in the heroin pipeline between 
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Italy and New York (Davis, 1993). The collaborative and 
individual efforts of United States and Italian law 
enforcement agencies have significantly diminished the 
activity of Italian organized crime groups within their 
borders. However, Italian criminals have adapted to engage 
in global activities. Three Italian based groups – La Cosa 
Nostra from Sicily, the Camorra from Naples, and 
'Ndrangheta from Calabria – are engaged in a global 
business that generates about $ 110 billion a year. 
According to Becchi drugs are the major business of the 
Italian Mafia (Becchi, 1996). The Italian mafia also 
engages in money laundering, loan-sharking, counterfeiting, 
extortion, the infiltration of legitimate business, the 
corruption of government officials, and the training of 
other ethnic-based criminal groups throughout the Americas 
and Western Europe (Williams, 1999).  
Becchi also reports that the Sicilian Mafia has 
reached an agreement with the Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta to 
manage heroin trafficking. It also engages in the 
trafficking of cannabis products. In the past, Camorra has 
been the preeminent cocaine dealer among the Italians. 
Today, all the organizations take part in it (Becchi, 
1996). 
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 According to Becchi, there is no monopoly of a 
specific organized group in the Italian drug market, either 
in terms of area or substance. This is not only because 
there are a great number of dealers, but also because there 
are many wholesalers working in competition with one 
another. Becchi also argues that drug markets are ruled by 
disordered competition where entry is free and change is 
continuous. In other words, the Italian Mafia does not have 
a monopoly on drug trafficking in Italy because it is too 
inefficient and disorganized to stop competitors attracted 
by the high profits of the drug market. This argument is 
consistent with the failure of the Italian Mafia in the 
international arena. For example, in 1982, eighty percent 
of the heroin that reached the East Coast of America had a 
Sicilian Mafia connection. This rate was reduced to five 
percent in 1991 (Becchi, 1996). Similarly, Cesoni reports 
that Italians do not have a significant role as drug 
suppliers to the European drug markets (Cesoni, 1992). For 
example, they tried but failed to penetrate the British 
drug market (Ruggiero, 1992). Despite their failure in 
Northern Europe, Italian organized criminal groups may have 
taken the advantage of conflicts in former Yugoslavia where 
Italian organized criminal groups draw their supply.  
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Colombian Cartels 
The Colombian Cartels have an influence in Colombian 
politics that parallels their influence in the 
international drug arena. They have been notorious as the 
main enemy to the United States' war on drugs. Other 
criminal organizations have strived to adopt Colombia's 
narcodemocracy model, adopting corruption of officials as 
an essential norm of the drug business (Williams, 1996). 
The Colombian Cartels have a cellular structure with 
minimal communication between the cells. The cartels have 
an excellent organizational structure based on a clear 
hierarchy, functional specialization, and the forward 
integration of activities. Technology, in the way of mobile 
and cellular phones, encrypted faxes, satellites, beepers, 
GPS, and high speed boats, is heavily used to ensure the 
security of communications and consequently the secrecy of 
trafficking (Farah, & Kovaleski, 1998). Together its strong 
organizational structure and effective use of technology 
makes Colombians trade as “robust as ever,” even after the 
arrests or deaths of many major drug lords (Brooks, & 
Farah, 1998).  
Cocaine trafficking is the primary business of the 
Colombian Cartels. Approximately three-fourths of the 
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world’s cocaine is supplied by the Colombian Cartels. In 
addition to cocaine, in the last decades the Colombians 
have engaged in marijuana, and opium trafficking (Williams, 
1996). Colombians have changed their trafficking route. 
Forty percent of the cocaine traffic to the United States 
now moves through Caribbean routes, particularly Puerto 
Rico, after interdiction efforts at the United 
States/Mexico border were more improved. Puerto Rico, a 
United States territory, has relatively few customs checks. 
Also, the political and economic instabilities of some 
Caribbean islands make it easier to evade or corrupt local 
officials (Farah, & Kovaleski, 1998). For example, Haiti, 
due to its economic instability, has been victimized by 
traffickers (Kovaleski, 1998).   
Chinese Triads 
Triads are secret Chinese criminal organizations. They 
originated in the seventeenth Century as a political group 
who rebelled against the Manchu dynasty. Over time, they 
have evolved into powerful criminal organizations 
(Davidson, 1997). It was after the Chinese nationalists 
defeated the Manchus and established the Republic of China 
in 1911 that the Triad movement continued, not as a 
political movement, but as an organized criminal movement. 
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The Communist Revolution in mainland China drove many Triad 
members into Hong Kong. There, in a democratic, 
capitalistic environment, the Triads have grown stronger 
(Dombrink, & Song, 1997). Currently, the Triads, mostly 
based in Hong Kong, have about 160,000 members in spread 
out among approximately fifty groups. The major Triads are 
the Sung Lian Strength, Tian Dao Man Strength, Four Seas 
Strength, and United Bamboo Strength (Taiwan’s Triads, 
1997; Williams, 1996). 
The structure of the Triads and their affiliates tends 
to be nonhierarchical, task oriented, and bonded together 
by informal relationships. They tend to be organized as 
youth gangs, street gangs, criminal groups, multicrime 
syndicates, or criminal enterprises (McKenna, 1997). The 
businesses of these groups may be both legitimate and 
illegitimate. 
The Triads have benefited from a lack of preventive 
efforts and prosecutive sanctions in their countries of 
origin. They manipulate and co-opt the political, legal and 
commercial sectors as well as the media (McKenna, 1997; 
Shanghai’s Dark, 1994). This manipulation has been made 
possible through the compromising or corrupting of 
politicians, law enforcement personnel, lawyers, 
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accountants, community activists, managers and executives 
of media, banking and business corporations. All of this 
subversive activity takes place under the guise of 
legitimate business in the free enterprise system of Taiwan 
and Hong Kong. The individual freedom and human rights 
activism inherent in the democracy movements of these 
countries have also facilitated the activities of the 
Triads (Davidson, 1997). 
Today, the Triads are headquartered in Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and the United States. From these countries, the 
Triads traffic world wide in a variety of illicit goods, 
especially heroin. Davidson reports that Triads and other 
Asian based criminal organizations have connections to 
Southeast Asian heroin manufacturers in the Golden Triangle 
(Davidson, 1997). Law enforcement agencies have established 
that a significant percentage of American heroin is 
supplied by Triads. Furthermore, minimal safeguards on the 
movement of money into and out of Hong Kong makes it an 
ideal place for money laundering operations (Dombrink et 
al., 1997). 
Chinese Triads earn an estimated $200 billion annually 
from drug production and trafficking. In addition, growth 
industries for Chinese criminal alien smuggling, arms 
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trafficking, and trafficking in stolen cars, boats and 
electronics earn $3-4 billion each. Illegal gambling, 
extortion, forgery, counterfeiting, prostitution, loan-
sharking, infiltrating legitimate businesses, and real 
estate are also all part of the Triad’s repertoire. 
Naturally, they also have extensive money laundering 
systems (Assault on Dollars, 1995; Macau’s Big Bet, 1997; 
Volobuev, 1990).  
In the last decade, human trafficking for cheap labor 
into North America has grown considerably. In Canada, four 
out of every ten Chinese admitted for residency were 
eventually smuggled into the United States after paying 
about $30,000 to the Triads (A New Chinese, 1993). Like the 
Soviet Red Army, members of China's People's Liberation 
Army are willing to sell their weapons to organized 
criminals, including Kalashnikov machine guns (AK-47s), 
grenades, and rocket launchers. In addition to their 
illegitimate businesses, Triads have skimmed billions of 
dollars off of legitimate businesses, such as 
infrastructure projects (Taiwan’s Dirty, 1997).  
The Triads have achieved some degree of popularity in 
their countries. This may be attributed to by the 
intellectual capacity of Triad leaders. For example, White 
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Wolf Zhang, the leader of the United Bamboo Triads, holds 
five bachelor's degrees. Three of them were earned while 
attending American universities. The other two he earned 
while serving a ten year sentence at the United States 
federal penitentiary at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for 
conspiring to buy heroin.  Zhang, who is known as a 
courteous, intellectual and self-styled Chinese patriot, 
believes in the right of Triads to exist in Chinese society 
(In White Wolf’s Lair, 1997). 
Japanese Yakuza 
The origin of the Yakuza can be traced as far back as 
the year 1612, when men known as kabuki-mono or “the crazy 
ones,” gained attention of local authorities (Yakuza, 
1999). While the kabuki- mono became known for their 
brutality, reportedly going so far as to stab people for 
pleasure, they were decidedly loyal to each other. They 
protected each other, even if it meant going against their 
own family. The kabuki-mono were known to be masterless 
samurais or “ronin,” and several of them began to wander 
around in Japan as a band of robbers, plundering villages 
and small cities.  
The Yakuza do not view the kabuki-mono as their 
“ancestors,” however, They see the Machi-yakko or “City 
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servant,” as their predecessors. Machi-yakko men took up 
weapons and defended their villages and homes against the 
oppression of the Kabuki-mono. The Machi-yakko had 
professions. They were storekeepers, tavern-owners, 
traveling mercenaries, and also ronin. The Machi-yakko 
were daring but skillful thrill-seekers who had close ties 
to each other and their leader, much like today’s Yakuza. 
The Machi-yakko soon became the people's heroes. They were 
praised by the citizens for their help against Kabuki-mono. 
The Machi-yakko were often weaker and less trained and 
equipped than the Kabuki-mono. They were seen as heroes of 
the people, comparable to England’s Robin Hood who robbed 
from the rich to give to the poor (Johnson, 2000). However, 
over the years the word Yakuza has gained widespread use 
among the Japanese public as a generic name for all 
Japanese organized criminal groups as well as individual 
criminals (Kaplan, & Dubro, 1986).  
In the 1920s, increased police crack-downs on 
gambling, which is the major source of profit for the 
Yakuza, gave new opportunities to organization shift their 
activities. Economic depression and the movement of the 
aristocracy towards communism and/or democracy created a 
favorable environment for Japanese criminal organizations. 
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By the 1930s, in Japan, two prime-ministers and two finance 
ministers were murdered and several politicians and 
businessmen were attacked. The Yakuza1 supplied muscle and 
men in order to help and educate these underworld 
organizations (Johnson, 2000). 
After WWII, a new type of Yakuza began to emerge 
because of unusual degree of tolerance by the Japanese 
public as well as the police force (Wanner, 1992). This 
Yakuza2, a tougher, more violent version of the earlier 
Yakuza, stole goods in order to trade them on the black 
market on liquor and food (Yakuza, 1999).  
Today, in general, there are two types of yakuza: 
freelance and clan-yakuza (Yakuza, 1999). Freelance-yakuza 
generally does not commit any major crimes. He may belong 
to a small group of hustlers or he may work alone. Because 
they lack strength in numbers, freelance-yakuza are 
particularly vulnerable. Clan-yakuza, as their name 
suggests, are composed of many loyal members, clan-yakuza 
may frame freelance-yakuza for clan-yakuza crimes. If the 
freelance-yakuza earns too much money, the clan-yakuza 
terminate the freelancing-yakuza. Freelance-yakuza are also 
                                                 
1 This type of Yakuza is called unyoke (political right). 
 
2 This type of Yakuza is called gurentai (street hustler). 
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punished for operating within clan-yakuza territories. 
Clan-yakuza do, however, have a certain use for freelance-
yakuza. If the clan-yakuza do something that they do not 
want the clan to be associated with, they may hire a 
freelance-yakuza for that specific job. Furthermore, clan-
yakuza, sometimes use freelance-yakuza as a scapegoat. If a 
freelancer is skilled enough, he may establish his own 
clan. Usually a freelance-yakuza, if he is not killed 
first, becomes a member of a clan.  
The clan- yakuza belong to a clan. The Yakuza clan 
structure is similar to the structure of Sicilian mafia 
families. It also resembles the common family structure of 
a traditional Japanese family, and is therefore vertically 
hierarchical. The clan chief is called an Oyabun, which 
means Father. Beneath him are his children, the Wakashu and 
his brothers, or Kyodai3. The Oyabun’s words are law within 
the clan. Every member of the clan is to obey the Oyabun 
without hesitation. In return, he protects them against all 
dangers. Beneath Oyabun, is an adviser who is called the 
Saiko-komon. The Saiko-komon has a staff of advocates, 
accountants, secretaries and advisers.  
                                                 
3 Wakashu and Kyodai are usually not real children and brothers of 
Oyabun. They are the name of positions within the clan. 
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The “children,” or Wakashu are under the Waka-gashira 
who is second in command. His authority is exceeded only by 
the Oyabun. The Wakashu acts as a supervisor, making sure 
that the orders of the Oyabun are carried out. The children 
may also be leaders over their own. In that way the clan 
braches out into several sub-families. 
The “brothers,”or Kyodai are under the  Shatei-
gashira. The Shatei-gashira is of higher rank than Waka-
gashira but has less authority than Waka-gashira. "The 
Brothers" have their own "children" or "younger brothers," 
or Shatei.  Shateis may also have their own gangs. 
Although the Yakuza do not restrict their membership 
to persons from certain countries or strata of society 
almost all Yakuza have a common background. They are often 
 49
poor, criminals, and misfits4. The Yakuza may be youth that 
were abandoned by their parents, or who could not manage 
the pressures of school. They may be refugees from Korea, 
China, or other countries. The Yakuza provide a family for 
those who have none. Bosses become fathers. Comrades become 
brothers. The Yakuza takes care of the misfits of society, 
giving them a sense of belonging and a feeling of strength. 
The Yakuza offers more than companionship. It offers money, 
status, and authority, making members feel that they are 
useful and needed5. An exchange for all of these benefits, 
Yakuza superiors demand absolute loyalty and obedience.  
In the beginning of nineteenth century there were 
approximately 5200 different gangs in Japan. Between the 
years 1958 and 1963, the number of yakuza members increased 
tremendously to 184,000 members, more than the entire 
Japanese army. In 1988 they were down to 3400 gangs with 
100,000 members (National Police, 1989). The Yakuza gangs 
                                                 
4 The yakuza members are all men. The only visible woman in the group is 
the boss' wife, called ane-san. Ane-san means "older sister." All 
members give her the same respect as the boss because she is his wife. 
However, she does not get involved in the business. Her position in the 
group is as the boss' wife, and not a member of a group. The yakuza do 
not trust women because they believe that women are weak. They believe 
that women cannot fight like men, that women are not born to fight. To 
a yakuza member, the most important thing is courage. If there is a 
battle, you must be ready to fight to the death, rather than lose the 
battle (Sundara, 2001).  
 
5 This situation is the same for the American gangs, as well. 
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began to mark out their territories, and all-out, bloody 
wars started between the gangs. The wars between the gangs 
were settled by a man named Yoshio Kodama, a comparable 
counterpart to America’s Al Capone. 
 The Yakuza used to be seen as the Machi-yakko, the 
people's rescuer and helper of the public. Far before any 
working courts existed in Japan the Yakuza existed. If a 
clan chief or other public official could not or would not 
help to resolve a dispute, an individual in need could turn 
to the local yakuza for help. The Yakuza solved problems in 
return for money.  Today, the people can still apply to the 
Yakuza for help. The major difference between the 
techniques of the Yakuza then and now is that now the 
Yakuza techniques are more brutal.   
Today, an overall lack of adequate legislation has 
created a favorable environment for the Yakuza6. Today, the 
Yakuza are involved in various types of businesses, 
including gambling, drugs, prostitution, casinos, brothels, 
loan-sharking, blackmail, arms trading, the stock market, 
and real estate (Seiichi, 1996; Wanner, 1992; Who got 
Yakuza, 1996). According to Sundara, gambling, primarily 
                                                 
6 For example, there is no law in Japan prohibiting money laundering, 
and racketeering. The Boryokudan Countermeasures Law accepted in 1992   
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dice games, is a major source of business for the Yakuza. 
There are several kinds of dice games. The most popular 
game is cho ka han ka which means odds or evens. The stakes 
in this game are very high. If the gamblers are all yakuza, 
they may bet as much as ten thousand dollars for one play. 
Sometimes they make more than a million dollars a day. In a 
traditional dice game, all gamblers are expected to be 
professional. When the gamblers come into a room, they do 
not speak. The only thing that is heard is the sound of 
money being put down. Even though this is an old style of 
gambling, many groups still play this game because the 
Yakuza like to follow tradition (Sundara, 2001). 
The yakuza also make money from prostitution. They 
hire girls who are younger than eighteen years old. There 
are many ways to make a profit from this business, but the 
most popular one is the "date club." Some groups make more 
than a million dollars a month from this business. The date 
club is a men's club. There is a membership fee of at least 
one thousand dollars to join. Most customers are rich, 
middle-aged men, including doctors, lawyers, and company 
presidents. Club members are shown pictures of the young 
girls who are available, and date with the chosen girl is 
arranged. The men then have to pay a fee of about two 
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hundred dollars for the date, and all other expenses. After 
the date, the customer calls the club and tells them 
whether they liked the girl, and whether or not they would 
like another date. The fee for sex with the girl may be a 
thousand dollars or more. The hiring of high school 
students as prostitutes is prohibited by the law. However, 
some high school girls are willing to work as prostitutes 
because they can earn more money doing this than from any 
other part-time job (Sundara, 2001).  
 The Yakuza has perfected its own style of corporate 
extortion. It is called Sokiya. The Yakuza purchase stock 
in a company, only to then send armed thugs to disrupt 
stockholders’ meetings until they are paid off (Volobuev, 
1990). Besides operating in Japan, the Yakuza are known to 
operate in Costa Rica, Honolulu, Los Angeles, San Jose, San 
Francisco, and other spots in the Pacific region. 
Methamphetamine is one of the Yakuza's chief exports from 
Asia, and guns are one of its chief imports (William, 
1996). The Yakuza has also been a key force in developing 
the Southeast Asian "sex slave" business. 
The yakuza also engages in the food distribution 
businesses. They buy cheap food, which has not been 
approved by governmental authorities to be safe for public 
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consumption, then distribute the food as approved food. For 
example, they have been known to import beef contaminated 
with E-coli, and distribute it around the country (Silence 
of the Calves, 2001) 
In addition to illegal business, the yakuza engages in 
legitimate business dabbling in banking, the stock market, 
and land trading. Through legitimate businesses, they 
artificially manipulate the market to obtain more profit. 
For example, they artificially devaluate the land prices 
and then buy land. After own the land, they increase the 
market to the normal value or higher value (Hirotoshi, 
1996).   
Most of the money that the yakuza make is spent on the 
purchase of weapons. Each group has its own territory. 
Territory is very important to the yakuza. When they do 
business, they cannot break into another group's territory. 
If one group tries to break move in on another's territory, 
it will be defended, usually through violence.  
In Japan, the general public cannot carry a weapon 
without a permit, but the yakuza do not respect the law. 
Many citizens become victims of the yakuza's battles. When 
they are at war, each Yakuza group tries to kill the boss 
of the other group. A group without a boss is weak and has 
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no power to fight. The boss is God. Without him, they 
cannot do anything. Whoever wins the battle takes over the 
group that was defeated and their territory. 
Today’s Yakuza is increasingly sophisticated and 
international. During Japan's booming economy in the second 
half of the 1980s, the Yakuza's businesses and investments 
were extremely profitable. The Yakuza were able to borrow 
substantial amounts to finance real estate and high-finance 
deals (Cox, 1996). The businesses of the Yakuza is no 
longer confined to gambling or construction. In fact, the 
Japanese economy ceded to the underworld the equivalent of 
the gross national product of Singapore, the Philippines, 
or Malaysia. With the exception of the Russian Mafia's 
looting of the former Soviet republics, it was "the largest 
transfer of wealth to an underworld in modern history" 
(Kaplan, 1986).   
Other Groups 
In addition to the “Big Five” criminal organizations, 
there are others around the world. They include the 
Jamaican posses, Nigerian traffickers, Pakistani drug 
traders, Afghani poppy farmers, Mexican launderers and 
distributors, Turkish drug traffickers, and so forth. These 
other smaller criminal organizations are usually 
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manipulated by the Big Five organizations.they are used as 
satellites to recruit new subgroups around the world to 
distract law enforcement agencies from larger operations 
(Kovaleski et al., 1998). 
The Main Activities of International Organized Criminal 
Groups 
International organized criminal activities pose a 
threat to the three pillars of state sovereignty: the 
control of national borders, the monopoly on the use of 
violence to enforce the law, and the power to tax the 
economic activities that occur within the state. 
International criminal organizations present 
themselves as viable alternatives to legitimate state 
power, thereby undermining stability and state control. 
Their espousal of corruption in government threatens the 
development of democracy in many countries around the 
world. 
Drug Trafficking  
Needless to say, drugs are a huge source of income for 
organized crime groups. It is estimated that the drug trade 
yields $400 billion of revenue per year. The next chapter 
of this study is devoted to the drug business of organized 
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crime. Consequently, it will not be explored in this 
chapter. 
Support of Terrorist Groups 
Albini argues that terrorism is a political-social 
form of organized crime. Terrorist organizations behave 
like organized crime groups whenever the opportunity exists 
for a mutual exchange of services. This makes for natural 
blending as they cooperate with other organized crime 
groups, including drug traffickers, money launderers, 
hijackers, and others (Albini, 1971; Albini, Rogers, & 
Anderson, 1999).  
Williams, however, argues that terrorist groups turn 
to organized criminals as a source of funding for their 
activities. Many of them join in the criminals' exploits, 
particularly drug trafficking, to raise money to cover the 
expenses of weapons and activities. Conversely, organized 
criminals frequently employ terroristic methods, such as 
political assassinations (Williams, 1996).  
Sufficient evidence exists to support Williams’ 
argument. In fact, it is not random coincidence that the 
major terrorist organizations that have proliferated exist 
either in areas where there is major drug production or in 
areas along major drug trafficking routes. For example, the 
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“Shining Path” operates in an area where seventy percent of 
the cocaine production of the world is taking place 
(Tammen, 1991). According to Tammen, the “Shining Path” 
charges some illegal cocoa traffickers $20,000 per flight 
for its services, which include protection of traffickers 
(Tammen, 1991). Further, Nakamura argues that the “Shining 
Path” movement in the Upper Huallaga Valley, and Auaytia, 
Peru is fundamentally an armed resistance movement 
organized by local traffickers in 1983 against the anti-
narcotics law enforcement policies of the Peruvian 
government. He argues that this movement is not an armed 
revolutionary movement directly tied to the “Shining Path” 
party7. He further argues that a sufficient degree of 
violence must be maintained in order for organized crime 
groups to be able to force local farmers to cooperate in 
the production of coca. Furthermore, the Army, which is 
supposedly engaged in warfare against the “Shining Path,” 
shares in the profits. 
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri 
Lanka also raises money through the drug business (Chalk, 
2000). Seventy-five percent of heroin seized in Europe is 
                                                 
7 The “Shining Path” is an armed revolutionary insurrection in the 
Ayacucho region of the Andes, Peru (Nakamura, 1999). 
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connected with the Kurdish terror organization in Turkey 
(PKK), which controls one of the major drug routes in the 
world (Van Solinge, 1998). The IRA reportedly uses drug 
dealers and smugglers for political support (Silke, 2000). 
Similarly, terrorist groups in Colombia, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Lebanon, and Somalia, buy weaponry and supplies 
with money obtained from the drug trade.  
The connection between organized crime and terrorism 
has prompted the suggestion that just as the world 
community sanctions state sponsorship of terrorism, state 
sponsorship of organized crime should be recognized and 
sanctioned.  
Nuclear Material and Weapons Smuggling 
The concept of nuclear material and weapon smuggling 
arose after the collapse of Soviet Union. Authorities are 
aware of over eight hundred attempts to transport nuclear 
material out of the former Soviet Union since its break-up 
(Albini et al., 1999). There are two primary reasons for 
the proliferation of nuclear material and weapons smuggling 
in Russia. First, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the strong central government and its internal police, the 
KGB, have disappeared, and no other state institution has 
arisen to replace them (Hersh, 1994). In other words, there 
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are no adequate protective or preventive measures to keep 
Russian criminals from gaining access to nuclear 
stockpiles. Second, there is sufficient evidence that the 
Russian government is unable to account for all its nuclear 
bombs and other weaponry despite the fact that most of 
those bombs and weapons have an explosive force far greater 
than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 (Hersh, 
1994).  
As well as the Russian Mafiya, Italian organized 
criminal groups have interests in nuclear smuggling. 
Reportedly nuclear smuggling was one of the main topics at 
the Italian and Russian mafia summits during 1993 and 1994 
(Williams, 1996). It has also been reported that 
representatives of Iraq and North Korea are among the 
hopeful buyers of nuclear weaponry (Kellman, & Gualtieri, 
1996).  
Despite the large number of attempts to smuggle 
nuclear reactors out of Russia, none of the individual 
amounts seized so far have been large enough to make more 
than a crude bomb. On the other hand, the nature of the 
issue constitutes sufficient cause for alarm (Russian 
Gangsters, 1998). In fact, there are three reasons to be 
concerned about the current status of nuclear smuggling 
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operations. First, the incidents that have been reported 
may be the tip of the iceberg. This argument is 
strengthened by the apparent lack of adequate law 
enforcement personnel in Russia and other security 
shortcomings. Second, a handful of buyers might have 
preferred to buy small amounts of nuclear materials and 
collect them to build a nuclear bomb. They may choose such 
a tactic in order to divert the attention of authorities 
from the possibility of a nuclear bomb or other relatively 
more dangerous nuclear products. Third, the smugglers may 
still have the potential to sell a large amount of nuclear 
material, and they may be waiting for better opportunities 
(Russian Gangsters, 1998).  
Some recent examples highlight the global nature of 
nuclear smuggling. In 1998, the Italian police interdicted 
a shipment of enriched uranium rods, which were imported 
from Zaire but originated in the former Soviet Union 
(Russian Gangsters, 1998). In addition, in 1998, Turkish 
customs officers seized 5.4 kilograms of uranium 235 and 
7.1 grams of plutonium powder from eight men asking $1 
million for the material. Three of the men were from 
Kazakhstan, one from Azerbaijan, and four from Turkey 
(Goldstein, 1999). 
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Despite its tremendous potential danger, except for 
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material that codified nuclear smuggling as an 
international crime, the threat of nuclear materials 
smuggling has not been adequately assessed. According to 
Hersh, in the global arena there is a scarcity of 
international measure that clearly confirms nuclear 
smuggling as an international crime and a crime against 
peace (Hersh, 1994).  
Gambling and Other Economic Crimes 
 Gambling affects almost every facet of society; it 
corrupts police and politicians; it undermines the social 
order; it erodes morality; and it causes bankruptcies. 
Gambling is one of the major resources of organized 
criminal groups. Gambling has notoriously been a lucrative 
source of profit, particularly for the Yakuza. 
 Gambling takes on numerous legal and illegal forms. 
Gambling is by definition illegal if it is against the law. 
The many forms of gambling include card games, shooting 
craps, bingo, lotto, keno, pool games, billiards, 
lotteries, pinball and slot machines, betting on sports, ad 
infinitum. 
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To understand more about how organized crime is able 
to capitalize on gambling, it would be beneficial at this 
point to explain, as an example, the structure of a typical 
card game. Card games are well suited to syndicate-
controlled gambling houses. They are easy to set up and 
return large profit. They may be played in numerous 
environments. The local police are usually paid off. If the 
game is played in an apartment, a doorman is hired. Card 
dealers are hired for the game, and syndicate men provide 
protection. The games are run directly by syndicate men or 
by the affiliates of organized crime. The gambling house 
receives about five percent of every pot. 
 Organized criminal groups are involved in gambling, 
loan sharking, fencing, theft and other form of crimes 
either as direct actors and owners of the syndicate, or by 
providing protection services or “arbitration” for the 
owners of the syndicates. 
Prostitution 
The sex industry in some countries is managed by 
organized criminal gangs. It is estimated that that forty 
percent of the American sex industry and sixty percent of 
the international sex industry is controlled by organized 
criminal gangs (Richard, 1999). The prostitution networks 
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in Europe are mostly operated by Russians, Ukrainians, 
Yugoslavians, Albanians, and Turks (Paringaux, 1998). In 
the United States, they are operated by “loosely connected” 
Chinese, Russian, and Mexican criminal networks which are 
formed around a family (Richard, 1999).   
Asian Triads, for long years, have operated 
prostitution rings. They collect young females from the 
villages and make them work as prostitutes. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, organized criminal groups 
started to hunt for young females, particularly from Russia 
and Ukraine, to work as prostitutes. They hide themselves 
under the camouflage of mail order bride agencies, job 
hunters, travel agencies or entertainment companies. They 
promise a decent job and better life to their young female 
victims in exotic, far away places. The girls are then 
trafficked to other countries. After arriving in these 
countries, the abuse starts. Organized gangs treat them as 
slaves, forcing them to work as prostitutes to gain freedom 
from thousands of dollars of debt bondage. The gang seizes 
the passports of its victims, threatening to harm them and 
their families if they break their contract or seek help 
(Linda, 1997).    
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 Profits from the sex industry vary from country to 
country. Usually, a substantial part of the profit goes to 
pimps who are usually members of organized criminal gangs8. 
For example, in New York, a pimp charges $100, and the 
brothel owner charges $30 per client from each prostitute 
(Richard, 1999). Sometimes, the pimp sells a prostitute to 
the owner of the brothel for $15,000 or more (Richard, 
1999). 
Money Laundering 
Money laundering allows organized criminals to invest 
the proceeds of their illicit activities into legitimate 
business, widening the net of their liquid assets. The 
success of organized crime is based upon its ability to 
launder money (Financial Crimes, 1996). Drug traffickers 
alone launder an estimated $250 billion a year (Williams, 
1996). Money laundering has devastating consequences. It 
provides fuel for drug dealers, terrorists, and other 
criminal networks while undermining the integrity of the 
world’s financial institutions (Financial Crimes, 1996). 
Summary 
The second chapter of this study has provided a 
comprehensive definition of organized crime, and an 
                                                 
8 Pimps make five to twenty times as much money from a woman as they paid for her (Hughes, 2000). 
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overview of the main international criminal organizations, 
“The Big Fives” identifying their major activities. These 
criminal organizations take the advantage of the improved 
simplicity of international travel, the development of free 
trade, high technology communications and sophisticated 
money laundering techniques to further their criminal 
efforts. The second chapter emphasizes that the 
international organized crime is an urgent and rising 
problem, one that ought to be a cause for concern in the 
international law enforcement community. International 
organized criminal activities posses a threat to the three 
pillars of state sovereignty: the control of borders, the 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and the power 
to tax the economic activities that occur within state 
borders. International criminal organizations offer an 
alternative to legitimate state power, thereby undermining 
stability and state control. Their espousal of corruption 
in government threatens the development of democracy in 
many countries around the world.  
International organized crime groups are occupied in 
numerous criminal activities, including: support of 
terrorist groups; extortion; corruption; bribery; drug 
trafficking; money laundering; kidnapping; prostitution; 
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arms smuggling; and alien smuggling. The extensive 
political, economic, social and technological changes and 
advances that have taken place in the last two decades have 
given criminal groups the opportunity to become 
progressively more dynamic globally. The capability of 
international organized crime groups to settle in to these 




DRUGS: THE BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 
Drug crime is a destabilizing force. It can ruin 
global peace and security. It is capable of destroying the 
economic as well as ruining economic and political 
foundations of entire countries. 
The drug menace is spreading rapidly because it is 
promoted by terrorists and organized criminals. It feeds on 
human weakness. According to recent estimates, there are 
40,000 drug addicts in Poland and 70,000 in Ukraine and 
this number is rising. In Poland, drug related offenses 
such as production, distribution and smuggling almost 
doubled in the three year span between 1994 and 1997 
(United Nations, Economic Dimensions, 1998). 
The illicit drug phenomenon is not just a law and 
order problem. It is also a social, economic and political 
problem. It poses a threat to the social fabric of society, 
the legitimacy of the economic structures of states, and 
the sovereignty of governments. It threatens to upset the 
balance of law and order in peaceful societies. To 
understand the dynamics of both the drug industry and of
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international drug control strategies, this chapter will 
focus on the cultural, political and economic dimensions of 
drugs as well as the globalization of the drug trade and 
the drug business nexus.    
Globalization and the Drug Nexus 
Globalization is defined as the convergence of 
economic, political, social and cultural relations across 
borders. Facilitated by technological developments, 
globalization has been sustained by economic and political 
decisions that facilitate international exchange. It has 
offered increasing opportunities for the flow of capital, 
goods, people and information throughout the world. 
Furthermore, globalization has produced new patterns of 
hierarchy and dominance in the international system and has 
changed the role of the state in this system. Consequently, 
new forms of sovereignty (e.g. economic, multilateral, 
multinational) have emerged, and the fundamental nature of 
the relationships between economic and political systems 
(e.g. deregulation, informalization, corruption) have been 
changed. These changes in global political and economic 
systems have led to a convergence between the domestic and 
the international frameworks for policy making and the 
management of economic affairs (Cerny, 1995; Rosenau, 
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1992). These changes also led to unprecedented 
manifestations of power and wealth and allowed for their 
protection. For example, the power of market forces and the 
impact of neo-liberal reforms have each grown dramatically, 
giving private, non-governmental entities increasingly 
powerful roles. These entities are able to exert a great 
deal of influence on law enforcement policies and programs. 
They influence the international political economy, and 
therewith the distribution of power, wealth, and security 
in the international system. 
The redistribution of global in power and wealth has 
led to new opportunities for the expansion of transnational 
criminal enterprises. The turmoil and poverty that came 
with these changes in the international political economy 
offer a breeding ground for the drug industry. More and 
more people came to view drugs as a way to alleviate 
economic distress. More and more people began to fund their 
nationalist struggle through criminal enterprise (e.g. PKK 
in Turkey, the Shining Path in Peru and the Tamil Tigers in 
Nicaragua). 
By exploiting the opportunities produced by the 
globalization, some international organized criminal groups 
have extended their transnational operations so that they 
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have had considerable authority in the world’s society and 
in the world’s economy (Strange, 1996). The Italian Mafia, 
American La Cosa Nostra, Colombian drug cartels, Chinese 
and Hong Kong Triads, Japanese Yakuza, and several 
nationally or ethnically based organizations from former 
Eastern bloc countries are only the most commonly known 
examples of criminal networks. Their activities have 
expanded over the world because they competed and 
cooperated with each other. Drug trafficking, arms 
trafficking, prostitution, and extortion are just a few 
extremely profitable sources of revenue for these groups. 
Whatever their business, the fact is their activities not 
only offer them fast profits, but also the means to exert 
political power. 
Some drug entrepreneurs like the Colombian cartels, 
establish a power structure to protect themselves and to 
challenge the authority of states in specific areas. Such 
developments endanger the social body of the society 
because they give way to injustice, corruption, violence, 
and intimidation. 
In sum, important changes in the international 
political and economic system have been shaped by 
globalization in the last two decades. These changes have 
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offered unprecedented opportunities for the criminal 
groups, allowing for the complete redistribution of power 
and wealth. The existence and exploitation of these 
opportunities has forced states to look for new ways to 
deploy their resources, to control their societies, and to 
manage their interface with the outside world. 
Consequently, the process of globalization has been one of 
the determinant factors shaping the political and economic 
dimensions of the drug business throughout the world. 
Drugs: A Global Business 
The drug business is a global business magnified by 
modern technology. Illicit drug transactions can start at 
any location in the world, and may eventually cross 
national borders. A drug trafficker can make a huge 
transaction, starting in Asia and ending in the United 
States in one day because of technology. In fact, 
technology has brought the buyer and seller together by 
bridging not only distances but also cultures and political 
economies.  
From the marijuana, coca and poppy fields to the 
refining laboratories and further on to the consumers, 
drugs travel over many different routes of transport and 
distribution. They thereby cross many formal and informal 
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jurisdictions. Hence, the drug business is a problem of 
both the Western and Eastern hemispheres.  
India, one of the largest licit opium producers in the 
world, has a serious drug problem because some licitly 
produced opium find its way into the illicit market. 
India’s large poppy fields replenish a global shortage in 
the illicit opium market. Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran 
are also major producers of opium, although these countries 
have taken legislative and punitive actions against illicit 
drugs for more than a century. India enacted the India 
Opium Act in 1857, another act in 1878, and the Dangerous 
Drugs Act in 1930. Under these acts, the illegal 
possession, transportation, import, export and sale of 
opium are punishable. Iran took legislative action against 
illicit drugs back in the 1900s. In 1969, Iran imposed 
death penalties for drug traffickers (Bequai, 1979). 
Despite such legislations, there are two factors that make 
those countries attractive to illicit opium producers and 
traffickers. First, growing opium is more profitable than 
growing wheat for farmers in these countries. Second and 
most importantly, these countries have weak central 
governments. These governments have little control over the 
areas where opium is produced, particularly the rural areas 
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controlled by the tribesmen. The Golden Triangle produces 
about half of the illicit opium in the world. The central 
governments Thailand, Burma and Laos have exerted little 
control over illicit opium farmers. Similarly, there is a 
permissive atmosphere for drug use in Singapore and 
Thailand.     
Turkey has been a major bridge for drug traffic moving 
from East to West because of its geographical location. 
Besides, Turkey has been one of the major raw material 
suppliers for heroin. On the other hand, according to the 
Turkish Drug Reports, the considerable efforts of the 
Turkish law enforcement community and new legislative 
actions have significantly diminished illicit drug 
production in Turkey. Like Turkey, Italy has been a major 
bridge for drug trafficking. Morphine base from the Middle 
East to France, and heroin from Eastern countries to the 
United States are all trafficked through Italy. 
International drug traffickers made up of Sicilian, 
Corsican and Sardinian gangsters, as well as Turkish, 
Russian and Far Eastern groups make their way through 
Italy. 
On the Western side of the world, the drug problem 
appears to be more of an addiction problem because of the 
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large amount of drug users. In the UK, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Germany, France and the United States, the drug 
addiction problem has reached significant proportions. 
British people have used opium derivatives for several 
centuries. In the nineteenth century, opium was widely used 
for the treatment of colds and nervous conditions. In the 
UK, the Dangerous Drugs Act was enacted in 1920. It 
restricted the use and possession of opium derivatives to 
people designated by the home secretary and to patients who 
used them for medical treatment purposes. The Dangerous 
Drugs Act was updated in 1967 and the Misuse of Drugs Act 
was enacted in 1971. The 1971 Act provides treatment for 
addicts while providing severe punishment to traffickers.   
There is a very dynamic international division of 
labor in the distribution of production industry. 
Production centers for “natural” drugs, namely opium, coca, 
marihuana and their derivatives, can particularly be found 
in the “Golden Triangle” of South East Asia, the “Golden 
Crescent” in West Asia, in some Middle Eastern and Maghreb 
countries, and in Latin America. These regions compete 
increasingly with each other, with emerging production 
areas in former Eastern Bloc countries, and with producers 
in the western world, where synthetic drugs such as 
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amphetamines are produced. Some countries lie in key 
positions along transit routes for drugs heading to the 
most lucrative consumer markets in the United States and 
Europe. Countries that have “liberal” banking regulations, 
secrecy, confidentiality, and financial investment tools, 
especially play an important role in the laundering and 
investment of drug profits. These types of banking 
regulations protect confidentiality and provide key 
investment tools. Overall, the drug trade encompasses a 
very heterogeneous competition, where different drugs, 
different drug entrepreneurs, trafficking groups and 
diverse jurisdictions compete for market shares in many, if 
not all of the subsequent stages of the drug trajectory. 
Other Characteristics of the Drug Business 
Having discussed the global nature of the drug 
business, other characteristics of the drug business will 
now be explored. The drug business is multi-dimensional, 
encompassing at least the production, trafficking and 
distribution of the drug. Because of its multidimensional 
nature, the drug business is an organized criminal 
business. In fact, the process of arranging deals with 
farmers in one country, converting raw material into 
illicit drugs in a chemistry laboratory, trafficking across 
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the border, and eventually distributing the final product 
on the streets of another country is almost impossible to 
carry out without the benefits of an organized criminal 
network. Furthermore, several organized criminal groups 
work closely together to carry out their activities. For 
example, in the United States, the American, Italian and 
Corsican groups have worked closely together to operate a 
narcotics distribution chain throughout the country. 
 Drug entrepreneurs have a large personnel control 
problem. To find reliable and skilled personnel is quite 
hard in the criminal world. Accordingly, the drug 
entrepreneur has a tendency to hire people from his family. 
Even using these trusted personnel within his circle, the 
drug entrepreneur operates in secrecy. This makes his 
workload larger, limiting the number of operations he is 
able manage and the magnitude of his business (Duyne, 
1996).    
 The drug business cannot rise to the upper world 
economy. It is not a legitimate industry. There is complete 
secrecy in the drug business. That secrecy is an essential 
prerequisite to the drug business because of the need to 
avoid police detection and robbery by other criminals 
(Duyne, 1996).  
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Files and paperwork may become deadly weapons for drug 
entrepreneurs. The drug business has no direct relations to 
the upper world, or to its bureaucratic structures. 
However, a certain degree of bureaucratization is necessary 
when conducting a large-scale business. When vast amounts 
of contraband need to be moved, they cannot be hidden in 
small packets. The drug entrepreneur needs ships. 
Consequently, he needs a legitimate, organized business to 
pose as a front company. In this way he enters the 
upperworld economy (Duyne, 1996). 
Another reason that a drug entrepreneur might enter 
the upperworld economy is money management. Drug 
entrepreneurs have to manage their money either by 
reinvestment or by legal spending. These reinvestments and 
legal expenditures must be through legal bodies or 
financially secret bodies to justify the transactions that 
are made. At this point the drug business increasingly 
resembles legitimate industry. However, despite the 
similarities between the drug business and legitimate 
business, the drug business has some obvious and 
unavoidable differences. First, the commodity in the drug 
business is illegal and hidden in normal goods. Second, all 
transactions in the drug business are underground, and are 
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disguised by front companies. Finally, the business 
environment in the drug business is more hostile than a 
legitimate business environment.   
The drug business uses corruption to facilitate their 
actions. Organized criminal groups engaged in the drug 
business constantly fight for control of key shipping and 
receiving zones in their areas of business. They must 
control certain docks and border regions in order to move 
their product through the supply chain. Consequently, 
organized criminal groups use bribery and corruption to 
lessen the pressures of local government and facilitate 
transport. 
Nexus Between Drugs and Other Crimes 
The rise and success of the drug trade has been 
parlayed into other lucrative trafficking enterprises: 
trafficking in people, illegal migrants, children, or 
sexual slaves; conventional weapons; body parts; and 
nuclear materials. The drug business has also inspired many 
of the cooperative arrangements between different criminal 
organizations. For example, drug traffickers in Russia have 
formed logical partnerships along geographic lines, 
connecting to the Golden Crescent region of Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Iran via Central Asian contacts.  
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Cultural Dimensions of Drugs 
Although drug use is undesirable, it is functional. 
Drugs create their own culture. In fact, the drug trade 
provides something to do, places to go, deals to make, and 
status to maintain. Drug organizations have power, social 
status, and sources of wealth inside the community where 
the organizations supply drugs (Pearson, Gilman, & McIver, 
1991).  
Malinowsky describes the drug subculture as an 
adaptive mechanism, one that enables drug users to live an 
ordered social life in the environment created by the 
conditions of drug prohibition. This adaptive mechanism has 
two folds: external (or primary) adaptation and internal 
(or secondary) adaptation. External adaptation consists of 
man's adjustment to his geographical environment. This 
adaptation is motivated by his basic biological and 
physiological needs, “instrumental imperatives”. External 
adaptation is evident in all the various economic, 
political, educational and legal activities of human 
beings. Internal adaptation on the other hand is motivated 
by the necessity to harmonize the conflicting needs and 
aspirations of man or his “integrative imperatives”. This 
adaptation is integrated into normatively regulated social 
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behavior among all the activities of man. His instrumental 
imperatives urging him to perform. It must be emphasized 
that this adaptive mechanism or culture, with both its 
folds, is always end-oriented, the end being the 
satisfaction of the drug addicts’ primary and secondary 
needs. Furthermore, each and every constituent of it has a 
definite form and function as determined and defined by the 
cultural context which in turn is to be understood with 
reference to the social configuration to which it (the 
culture) belongs (Malinowsky, 1960).  
According to Malinowsky’s functionalistic perspective, 
the drug subculture exists because drug users have a basic 
physiological or instrumental need to ingest drugs. As an 
adaptive response to the hostile environment created by 
mainstream society, drug laws and the enforcement of drug 
laws, when drug users could not find either a positive 
label or an acceptable status, they have developed their 
own underground channels to secure the relatively 
undisturbed use and acquisition of drugs (Grund, 1993). 
Moreover, the stigma or deviant label attached to drug 
users thwarts their participation in conventional social 
structures, leading to increasing active involvement in the 
social structure formed around this stigmatized and deviant 
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activity: the drug subculture (Becker, 1973; Goffman, 
1963). The universal need for interaction, solidarity and 
harmony, or the integrative imperatives, will then lead to 
the integration of drug use in a subcultural set of rules 
ultimately aimed at maintaining the social structure that 
has grown up around the drug users’ need for drugs. 
Economic Dimensions of Drugs 
There is no fundamental difference between the drug 
market and any other commodity trade from an economic point 
of view. In fact, both are driven by the basic economic 
forces of supply and demand. Whether the supply and demand 
flourish depends on the form and relative prosperity of 
local legitimate economies (Collison, 1995). 
On the other hand, there is a significant difference 
between the drug market and any other commodity trade: 
drugs are not legal. Their legal status significantly 
influences market dynamics, including the price. According 
to Stares, supply is artificially constricted by the rules 
affecting which drugs can be legally produced, medically 
prescribed, and commercially sold. Supply is also affected 
by the many law enforcement barriers that restrict illicit 
manufacturers and distributors. He notes that as the 
availability of a commodity in demand goes down, its price 
 82
generally goes up. Furthermore, the illegality of the 
market allows drug providers to set prices at a level 
compensating them for the risk they take and their 
additional costs of supplying (Stares, 1996).  
According to the 2000 Annual Report of the Office of 
National Drug Policy, an estimated $50-100 billion is spent 
by the American people on illicit drugs each year. 
Worldwide, $400 billion in drugs are consumed each year 
(ONDCP, 2000). In 1994, this figure ($400 billion) would 
have been larger than the international trade in iron, 
steel, and motor vehicles, and about the same size as the 
total international trade in textiles (UNDCP, 1997). In 
1997, this figure was equivalent to about eight percent of 
total international trade (UNDCP, 1997). Kraar reports that 
the drug trade, worldwide, may be larger than the trade in 
oil, with an estimated trade volume of $500 billion a year 
(Kraar, 1996). Stares reports that the revenue of the drug 
trade is larger than the gross national product of three-
fourths of the 207 economies of the world. Furthermore, the 
United Nations believes that actual income of the drug 
business is a full $1 trillion per year (Stares, 1996). 
Drugs and drug related crimes form a crucial part of 
the irregular economy in poor communities. According to 
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Johnson, crimes committed by heroin users have important 
economic implications for the underground economy. 
Obviously, heroin users involve in the heroin trade. Not so 
obvious, however, is the impact they have on the stolen 
goods market, its extensive bartering system, the 
prostitution market and so forth. Thus, while heroin 
abusers commit many crimes that are both morally and 
politically unacceptable to the government and greater 
society, their crimes in the underground economy serve a 
valuable purpose. They serve more economic benefit in the 
underworld than harm (Johnson et al., 1985) 
 The drug industry constitutes the backbone of many 
national and local economies by either directly or 
indirectly providing income and employment opportunities to 
millions of people around the globe. Countries like 
Bolivia, Morocco, Mexico, and Afghanistan derive profits 
from this industry that rival their formal export income. 
Morocco, fulfilling a significant amount of European 
demands for cannabis and hashish, earns an estimated $5.75 
billion, twenty percent of its GNP, from the production and 
exportation of cannabis and hashish (Ouazzani, 1996). The 
Mexican drug economy has revenue of more than $20 billion. 
The Mexican drug sector is based mainly on the export of 
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homegrown marijuana and poppy derivatives, and the transit 
of Colombian cocaine to the United States. Within the 
United States, revenue earned from the drug demand exceeds 
the total gross domestic product of eighty-eight different 
countries (Akida, 1997; Tullis, 1995). From this data, it 
may be concluded that probably the greater part of drug 
profits never leave the main consumption countries, as 
those countries are likely to offer the most lucrative 
investment opportunities for profit. 
The Political Dimensions of Drugs 
The drug business is not just about money. It is also 
political. The head of Cali cartel, Gilberto Rodriguez 
Orejuela, thinks of it as a war, and he is producing a 
chemical poison to weaken the United States and its people. 
Because the United States is his only threat, he will do 
all he can to weaken the country. Similarly, as mentioned 
in previous chapters, separatist groups and terrorist 
organizations in such diverse places as Peru, Colombia, 
Peru, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Somalia, and Turkey are 
believed to purchase weaponry and supplies with money 
derived from the drug trade (Chalk, 2000; Nakamura, 1999; 
Silke, 2000; Tammen, 1991; Solinge, 1998). Thus, the income 
obtained through the sale of drugs is used by some 
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terrorist organizations to achieve their political aims. As 
a result, many countries are faced with a real threat to 
their sovereignty by the drug cartels with large fiscal 
resources (Bernal, Leslie, & Lamar, 2000). 
Drug crime erodes governmental legitimacy, and causes 
increased levels of corruption by government officials. 
Through corruption, drug entrepreneurs may pose as an 
alternative to legitimate state power, thereby, undermining 
democracy, governmental stability and state control 
(Rosenau, 1990). The drug business has war-like impacts on 
governments. It causes losses in productivity, strains on 
state budgets for health care and law enforcement, and 
increased victimization due to violence related to both the 
drug trade and drug addiction. (Viviano, 1999; Campbell, 
1998; Stares, 1996).  
Summary 
The drug phenomenon, regardless of whether it is 
viewed at a national, regional, or global level, is not a 
one-dimensional matter. Indeed, it is multidimensional both 
in characteristics and consequences. Production, 
trafficking, consumption, and money laundering are the 
major branches of drug problem. The drug trade brings major 
consequences, including economic resource depletion, crime, 
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and corruption. In order to understand the drug problem, to 
evaluate efforts to eradicate the drug problem and to 
produce feasible solutions, both the characteristics and 
consequences of the drug phenomenon must be thoroughly 
understood.  
The drug problem has its own cultural, economic, and 
political dynamics. The drug subculture provides norms, 
values, and status for abusers and traffickers. Crime, a 
major reflection of the drug subculture generates 
masculinity and short-term money. In some parts of the 
world, the young could not imagine buying a good car, a 
cellular phone, or a gun without getting into drug 
business. The drug economy, which is estimated to have a 
$500 billion volume, provides the young user with a taste 
of “the good life.” The production, consumption, and 
trafficking of drugs have emerged as a triple threat to 
economic development throughout the world. Drug traffickers 
corrupt the politicians to facilitate their job. 
Furthermore, the drug business is used by the terrorist 
organizations to raise funds for their illegal activities. 
All of these factors pose a serious threat to both national 
and international security. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ERADICATE THE DRUG BUSINESS OF 
ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THESE 
EFFORTS 
International Agreements and Conventions 
This chapter provides an overview of the current 
international and American regulations that address the 
problem of organized crime and its inherent corollaries. 
Just as organized crime could not exist without 
international cooperation, the only possible way to combat 
organized crime is through international cooperation.  
The United Nations and the United Nations Drug 
Convention 
The United Nations serves as an international forum 
for the exchange of information and for the adoption of 
guidelines concerning crime prevention and criminal 
justice. The effectiveness of the United Nations depends on 
the support of its more than 150 member states. The United 
Nations can only do what its member states permit, and they 
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are limited by their ability and willingness to pick up the 
bill.  
The United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice goes as far back as the United Nations 
itself. However, in its history, it gave minimal attention 
to the phenomenon of organized crime before the 1990s. 
There are two reasons for this lack of attention. First, 
the program has a narrow focus in terms of human rights. It 
has mainly addressed extending human rights protections to 
adult and juvenile offenders. This focus has resulted in 
the adoption of international guidelines by previous United 
Nations Congresses on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders. These guidelines covered areas such 
as the standard minimum rules for the behavior of law 
enforcement officers and the standards for the treatment of 
prisoner inmates (Steffens, 1990). The second reason the 
United Nations neglected to focus on organized crime has to 
do with the once-prevalent belief that organized crime was 
a phenomenon limited to a few specific industrialized 
nations. In fact, organized crime was perceived to be a 
problem in the Chicago area, or in most of the United 
States.  
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These two factors have changed in recent decades. 
First, the concept of human rights has been gradually 
extended, particularly to the area of the protection of 
victim’s rights. In fact, in 1985, the Seventh Congress, 
that took place in Milan, Italy adopted basic principles 
for the protection of victims. According to Steffens 
(1990), the change in the way that human rights are 
perceived brought about a gradual, internationalized 
understanding of the organized crime phenomenon. Before 
this international conceptualization, the definition of 
organized crime was restricted to crimes committed through 
the collaboration of several people. This understanding has 
become more international and it has been associated with 
drug trafficking. The Seventh Congress reflects this 
understanding (Steffens, 1990). 
The action plan of the Seventh Congress addresses the 
need for international cooperation to take effective action 
against organized crime and terrorism. In fact, the first 
resolution of the Seventh Congress asks that signatories 
arrange their international agreements, adopting new 
legislation to facilitate effective international 
cooperation to fight organized crime. The second resolution 
also addresses international drug trafficking. It calls 
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upon member states to make multilateral and bilateral 
agreements in terms of extradition, mutual judicial 
assistance, and the transfer of criminal proceedings 
(Steffens, 1990). 
 
The 1998 United Nations Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances or 
the “United Nations Drug Convention,” had almost the same 
language as the language of the Seventh Congress. In fact, 
it contains provisions regarding mutual legal assistance, 
as well as other forms of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements (Kellman et al., 1996). Even though the United 
Nations Drug Convention deals specifically with drug 
crimes, it recognizes the link between the drug trade and 
other organized criminal activities. Article Three of the 
Convention provides for the criminalization of a broad 
range of activities related to the drug trade, including 
the production, transport, and sale of drugs. It also 
criminalizes those who organize, manage, or participate in 
schemes to traffic in drugs. Article Six provides that the 
United Nations Drug Convention serve as an extradition 
treaty for countries who are party to the agreement, 
separate extradition agreements in place. The United 
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Nations Drug Convention also provides for the gradual 
improvement of international cooperation in the 
investigation and prosecution of drug trafficking and money 
laundering. The United Nations Drug Convention serves as a 
model for drafters of the proposed convention against 
transnational organized crime. Furthermore, it serves as a 
warning about the consequences of the failure of an 
international agreement.  
Conventions on Money Laundering 
The United Nations Drug Convention requires that all 
member states criminalize money laundering, institute 
banking safeguards, and provide for mutual legal assistance 
(Sterling, 1994b). Both the United Nations Drug 
Convention's money laundering provisions and the Council of 
Europe’s Money Laundering Convention have focused the 
attention of world leaders on the money laundering problem 
and they have accelerated the emergence of international 
anti-money laundering actions (United Nations, Convention 
Against, 1998).  
The Council of Europe's Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and the Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime, the “Laundering Conventions,” criminalizes money 
laundering at the domestic level and provides for 
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international cooperation in investigation and prosecution, 
and establishes guidelines for the forfeiture of the 
criminal proceeds (Council of Europe, Convention on 
Laundering, 1991). This Convention was ratified by thirty-
four countries as of June 11, 2001. The Laundering 
Convention is also open to non-member signatories. 
Australia, a non-member state has signed the Convention, 
and the United States and Canada have considered it 
(Council of Europe, Signatures and Ratifications, 1999).  
The 1988 Basel Declaration of Principles, applicable 
to central banks in twelve countries, requires full 
cooperation with law enforcement. According to the 
Principles, the banks are required to disclose large and/or 
suspicious transactions in order to assist the 
investigations concerning money laundering (Savona, 1996).  
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), formed by the 
G-7 Economic Summit in 1989, is one of the key 
organizations addressing the money-laundering problem in 
global perspective. The FATF, comprised of twenty-six key 
countries as well as the European Commission and the Gulf 
Cooperation of Council, is dedicated to combating money 
laundering by promoting cooperative counter-money 
laundering efforts among its members (Financial Crimes, 
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1996). The major work of the Task Force has been the design 
of "Forty Recommendations" designed to serve as a blueprint 
for the establishment and implementation of anti-money 
laundering laws and programs. These “Forty Recommendations” 
contain ratified multilateral agreements that suggest the 
extradition of criminals and mutual legal assistance, the 
criminalization of money laundering, forfeiture 
legislations, regulations regarding customer 
identification, careful record-keeping and diligent 
financial institutions, and measures to assist countries 
without adequate anti-money laundering regimes. The FATF 
Recommendations also encourage governments to improve 
international cooperation through the exchange of 
information, legislative harmonization, and bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, such as the Council of Europe’s 
Laundering Convention (Savona, 1996).  
In 1994, the United Nations’s Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Branch arranged the “International 
Conference on Preventing and Controlling Money Laundering 
and the Use of the Proceeds of Crime.” This convention, 
subtitled “A Global Approach” met at Courmayeur in Italy. 
Representatives from forty-five countries attended. 
Participants advocated establishing an international anti-
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money-laundering regime through the adoption of the 
provisions of the United Nations Drug Convention, the Basel 
Declaration, and the FATF's Forty Recommendations. In 
particular, the Conference stressed measures by all nations 
to limit bank secrecy, enact "know your customer" rules, 
identify and report suspicious transactions, improve 
regulations of all businesses (not just banks) engaged in 
financial operations, enact asset forfeiture measures, and 
establish effective international cooperation mechanisms 
(United Nations, International Conference, 1996). 
Anti-Corruption Agreements 
Organized crime and corrupt government officials often 
have symbiotic relationships. Therefore, anti-corruption 
sanctions and international cooperation to counter 
corruption are essential in the fight against transnational 
crime. The member nations of the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and five other non-OECD 
nations, signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention) on December 17, 
1997. Article One of the Convention criminalizes the act of 
offering, promising, or giving a bribe to a public 
official. It also criminalizes those who attempt to 
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conspire, or assist in those acts. Furthermore, it requires 
the signatories to make both legal and natural persons 
punishable for the bribery of officials. Article Nine of 
the Convention contains provisions regarding mutual legal 
assistance, and Article Ten contains provisions regarding 
extradition. In addition to the OECD's Anti-Bribery 
Convention, the member nations of the OAS have agreed to 
the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (Zagaris, 
& Ohri, 1999). 
Interpol 
Founded in 1923, the International Police Organization 
(Interpol) acts as a coordinating body among disparate 
domestic law enforcement entities, providing an environment 
for the exchange of information related to criminal 
activities. It serves to strengthen relationships between 
agencies and improve law enforcement techniques among 
domestic police forces (Kellman et al., 1996).  
Interpol has advanced the concept of international law 
enforcement in three ways. First, it connects national and 
local police agencies from all over the world through a 
quick and reliable network. Second, it facilitates the 
exchange of information concerning new law enforcement 
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methods. Finally, it improves the harmonization of tactics 
and the concerns of law enforcement all over the world.  
Interpol currently has 170 member nations (Financial 
Crime, 1996). Although some of the members are inactive, 
almost every member of the United Nations is also a member 
of Interpol, including most former Soviet and East Bloc 
nations (Abadinsky, 1990; Kellman et al., 1996). A full 
sixty percent of Interpol's activity is focused on drug 
trade. However, it also has task forces concentrating on 
international terrorism, nuclear smuggling, money 
laundering, and human and firearms trafficking. In 1995, at 
the 64th session of Interpol’s General Assembly, the first 
anti-money laundering declaration was presented (Financial 
Crimes, 1996; Kellman et al., 1996).  
The United States National Center Bureau, a United 
States Interpol liaison agency located in Washington, D.C., 
receives about twelve thousand requests for assistance from 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies each 
year. The requests are entered into a computer information 
system, and are then forwarded to senior staff members who 
serve as case investigators. These cases cover a variety of 
crimes, ranging from murder, drug trafficking, robbery, and 
firearms trafficking, to counterfeiting and fraud 
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(Abadinsky, 1990). The Financial and Economic Crime Unit at 
Interpol headquarters serves as a database that collects 
and distributes information related to credit card fraud, 
airline ticket counterfeiting, computer crime, off-shore 
banking, commodity futures, and money laundering schemes. 
The monitoring of such activities can sometimes lead to the 
identification of suspects involved in drug trafficking or 
other types of organized crimes (Abadinsky, 1990). 
Interpol’s authority and jurisdiction, however, are 
limited. For example, it does not have the power to 
investigate or arrest suspects. Individual countries 
participate on a voluntary basis through separate bilateral 
agreements between their national police forces and 
Interpol. There is no overall treaty. Indeed, Article Five 
of The New United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and 
the works of the Council of Europe’s Select Committee of 
Experts on International Cooperation states that if 
Interpol were given greater power, even the modest ability 
to share information without first obtaining express and 
time-consuming permission from individual states, it could 
serve as a valuable resource to battle transnational crime. 
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Multilateral and Regional Agreements 
Regional arrangements are better than bilateral 
arrangements. They provide for more efficient and effective 
solutions, and they fortify weaker countries against the 
attacks of organized criminal groups (Lavey, 1990; 
Volobuev, 1990). 
The European Union 
In its early efforts to combat organized crime, the 
European Community has made many attempts to draw up a 
comprehensive inventory of the organized crime groups that 
are active in its territory. However, these attempts could 
not produce effective results because of the considerable 
variation among the Member States in the criteria they used 
in their assessment of organized crime (Anderson, 1995; 
Boer, 1999). Despite this initial failure at the European 
Union level, the efforts have been continued.   
In Europe, since 1950, there has been an important 
multilateral approach to combating organized crime. The 
creation of a unified European police and criminal 
prosecutorial system has been debated for years. As a 
consequence of these debates, many agreements and treaties 
were made that facilitate of cooperation among criminal 
prosecutors. These include conventions on Extradition 
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(1957), Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959), the 
International Validity of Criminal Judgments (1970), and 
the Transfer of Criminal Proceedings (1972). 
In order to support the Laundering Convention of the 
Council of Europe, the European Community has agreed on a 
Directive to Prevent the Use of the Financial System for 
the Purpose of Money Laundering. This Directive requires 
greater disclosure of financial transactions (Council of 
Europe, Council Directive, 1991). A significant portion of 
the Directive pertains to international cooperation at all 
stages, from investigation to trial to forfeiture of 
proceeds (Duyne, & Levi, 1999).   
During the discussions leading up to the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Political Union, the members agreed to 
the establishment of Europol, a Central European 
Investigation Bureau. The Treaty on the Establishment of a 
European Police Office was adopted via the Council Act of 
July 26, 1995. However, it did not enter into force until 
each member state had notified the Council that its 
individual national government bodies had adopted the 
convention (European Union, The Treaty on the 
Establishment, 1995). Consequently, Europol began its 
operations in October 1998 (Bremner, 1998). Monaco argues 
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that Europol assumes the role of its predecessor, the 
Europol Drugs Unit (EDU), which has carried out the 
coordination of law enforcement efforts in the area of drug 
trafficking since 1993. Furthermore, it is charged with 
fighting terrorism, nuclear smuggling, illegal immigrant 
smuggling, and motor vehicle crimes.  In the formal 
documents of Europol, the major tasks of Europol are 
reportedly to aid the investigations of national law 
enforcement agencies, and to maintain a computerized 
database of collected information (European Union, The 
Treaty on the Establishment, 1995; Monaco, 1995). 
The creation of Europol, an international cooperative 
structure, has imposed a demand upon the criminal justice 
systems of the member states to improve the coordination of 
information exchange and to make accountability procedures 
more transparent at higher law enforcement levels. The 
first reason for this demand is the diplomatic importance 
rendered to well coordinated covert operations against the 
transnational organized criminals. The second reason is 
that international cooperation has made the internal 
organizations of individual criminal justice agencies more 
likely to undergo inspection from other agencies (Boer, 
1999). Despite these invaluable consequences that require 
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more accountability, more efficiency and more transparency 
to facilitate coordination and centralization, regional law 
enforcement agencies are not enthusiastic about sharing 
information at both the national and international level. 
Indeed, this lack of enthusiasm is an inherent aspect of 
the police culture. Therefore, Boer suggests that the major 
task of Europol must be to change this culture that 
promotes excessive secrecy and the parsimony of sharing 
information. These same equalities allow for the existence 
of bribery and corruption (Boer,1999). 
Despite the efforts to establish a pool of resources 
to combat crime in Europe, the individual governments still 
hesitate to give a single body independent law enforcement 
powers. Both Europol and the EDU, which were preceded by 
the Trevi Group, have been in charge of the coordination of 
national efforts to combat international organized crime. 
According to Klosek, neither organization has been 
successful in terms of improving the level of coordination 
established during the Trevi era (Klosek, 1999). In fact, 
they do work as channels for information exchange among 
national law enforcement bodies, but they do not serve as 
independent enforcement organizations, which they were 
supposed to have been in the first place. Like Interpol, 
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Europol participation occurs on voluntary basis. 
Consequently, Europol has failed to be a strong 
multilateral law enforcement body (Fijnaut, 1996).  
 Article K of the Maastricht Treaty requires 
signatories to agree to a cooperation in law enforcement 
matters. On the other hand, since the regulation of crime 
is a matter of domestic legislation, and many European 
Union members are reluctant to implement Article K 
requirements through legislation, Article K has not been 
effective.  
On the other hand, in Europe, there have been some 
successful attempts to reach stronger cooperative 
arrangements between the law enforcement programs of 
several European countries. For example, the Schengen 
Convention regulates cross-border pursuits and information 
sharing by the police forces of different countries. The 
original parties to the 1985 Schengen Convention were 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Germany. 
In 1990, Schengen II was signed by, Spain, Portugal, Italy 
and Greece. In 1997, Austria signed the Convention (Klosek, 
1999). 
The multilateral approach of the European Union to 
combat organized crime has shown the difficulties 
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associated with multilateral agreements.  In fact, 
multilateral agreements that bind different states on 
different terms and conditions are difficult to apply in 
practice. Furthermore, the vast differences between the 
criminal justice, legislative, and judicial systems of the 
various countries make a uniform implementation of 
agreements difficult. 
The Continental Americas 
The regions outside Europe have not produced the same 
types of wide-scale multilateral arrangements for combating 
organized crime as those made in Europe. The Inter-American 
Drug Abuse Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of 
American States (OAS), the Caribbean Financial Action Task 
Force (CFATF) and various arrangements in the League of 
Arab States are a few examples of the types of the 
arrangements that have been made outside of the European 
Continent (Williams, 1996).  
In the Caribbean and Latin America, there have been 
some regional agreements aimed at increasing cooperation 
against organized crime. For example, the Inter-American 
Convention on Extradition was held in 1981 (Organization of 
American, 1981). Similarly, in 1991, CICAD prepared a model 
for anti-money laundering legislation. The same legislation 
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was adopted by OAS members in 1992. In the last decade, the 
summit meetings of the Americas regarding cooperative crime 
fighting efforts have resulted in a number of agreements 
and initiatives. OAS members, in their 1994 Plan of Action, 
agreed to ratify the U.N. Drug Convention, enact laws 
regarding the forfeiture of proceeds, implement the CFATF 
recommendations, implement other drug control programs and 
legislation, and consider an Inter-American convention on 
money laundering (Zagaris, 1996).  In 1996, twenty-one 
members of the OAS signed the Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption. The other OAS members signed the 
Convention after it entered into force. Arguably, that the 
OAS Convention Against Corruption has been more effective 
than the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in at least one 
respect, it allows for the extradition not only of bribe-
givers, but bribe takers as well (Nichols, 1999). 
 In 1995, the U.N. organized a workshop in Buenos 
Aires. This workshop produced the Buenos Aires Declaration 
on Prevention and Control of Organized Transnational Crime 
(Buenos Aires Declaration). The Buenos Aires Declaration 
emphasizes the need for a coordinated hemispheric approach 
to combat organized transnational crime (United Nations, 
Implementation of the Naples, 1996).  
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In 1992, the CFATF adopted the forty recommendations 
of the FATF. Furthermore, it adopted twenty-one additional 
recommendations of its own (Kellman et al., 1996). The 
Caribbean Common Market and Community (CARICOM) has also 
discussed developing joint strategies to protect banking 
systems in the region from exploitation by international 
drug traffickers (Zagaris, 1996). The 1997 Summit of the 
United States and the Caribbean produced the Bridgetown 
Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action. This plan 
suggests several measures, including: the providing of 
United States assistance in training law enforcement 
personnel and enacting legislative reforms; mutual legal 
assistance among the Caribbean countries that have not yet 
done so; cooperation among law enforcement agencies that 
enables joint training and information exchange; and 
improving the implementation of the U.N. Drug Convention 
and banking regulations. The Bridgetown Declaration is 
comprehensive in that it addresses arms trafficking, 
corruption, money laundering, and alien smuggling, as well 
as the drug trafficking problems of the Caribbean region 
(Kovaleski et al., 1998).  
Reportedly regional efforts in the Americas are 
modeled on the European experience and are gradually 
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approaching an all-encompassing, hemispheric framework 
(Zagaris, 1996). According to one author the formation of 
an "Americas Committee," modeled after the European 
Committee on Crime Problems, is needed to review existing 
legislation, suggest legal measures, draft legislation, and 
move the region toward harmonization (Nichols, 1999). 
Today the Caribbean countries very actively strive to 
achieve regional cooperation and seek assistance in 
combating organized crime, even though those efforts 
require some sort of sacrifice, such as giving up some 
degree of sovereignty in their countries (Kovaleski et al., 
1998). 
Other Regional Agreements 
 Several conventions have been held among the League of 
Arab States. To date, nineteen states have signed the 1983 
agreement on extradition. 
The United Nations has attempted to make agreements in 
various parts of the world. The United Nations Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Program has established 
many regional institutes for the purpose of gathering 
information from Africa, Asia, and other parts of the world 
on organized criminal activity (United Nations, 
Implementation of the Naples, 1996). In 1997, the United 
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Nations's Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division 
produced the Dakar Declaration as a product of the workshop 
at Senegal. The Dakar Declaration emphasizes efforts in to 
strengthen the criminal justice systems among countries of 
Africa; harmonizing legislation across the continent; and 
providing better training for law enforcement personnel 
(United Nations, Crime Prevention, 1997).  
 The United Nations's Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Division has held several conferences in Eastern 
Europe as well as the former Soviet Union. In 1995, this 
Division sponsored a seminar on drugs and crime in the 
region, bringing together the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations 
International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) for Central 
Asian states (United Nations, Implementation of the Naples, 
1996).  
The Boundaries of Domestic Efforts to Combat Organized 
Crime 
 Domestic law can provide an adequate foundation for 
the establishment of cooperation among nations to combat 
international organized crime.  
Local law enforcement agencies and judicial entities 
are limited in their activities due to the jurisdictional 
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restrictions of national boundaries. However, customary 
international law recognizes five justifications for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. First, a country is 
permitted to take action in criminal matters outside of its 
borders when that country’s territory has been threatened 
by the actions of an outside perpetuator. Second and 
thirdly, a country has extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
cases where either the perpetuator or the victim is a 
native of that country. These are known as active and 
passive personalities, respectively. Fourthly, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is allowed when a crime or 
conspiracy poses a threat to national interests, such as 
security, integrity, sovereignty, or other governmental 
functions. This is known as protective jurisdiction. 
Finally, universal jurisdiction allows states to prosecute 
criminals whose crimes are harmful to mankind. These types 
of crimes include piracy or war crimes. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIVE REMARKS - SUMMARY AND ARGUMENTS  
Summary 
 The Italian Mafia, Russian Mafiya, Colombian Cartels, 
Chinese Triads, Japanese Yakuza, La Cosa Nostra, and many 
other criminal organizations have become synonymous with 
corruption, terrorism, nuclear smuggling, drug trafficking, 
prostitution, extortion and manipulation. They are the 
embodiment of organized crime, involved in willful and long 
term criminal activities. They employ, within their own 
infrastructures, groups of persons who perform various 
tasks for the sole purpose of committing large-scale 
criminal acts. The aim of these groups is to make huge 
profits quickly. 
The problems caused by organized criminals are no 
longer confined to countries where those criminal groups 
are headquartered. Indeed, the phenomenon of gang networks 
has already crossed national boundaries, exploiting ethnic, 
historic and other similar ties throughout the world. 
Furthermore, these groups have increasingly become more 
sophisticated. They have used profits, power, and influence
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to insulate and protect their structure from discovery and 
prosecution. 
Organized crime exploits every possible lucrative 
illegal business, including the drug trade, firearms and 
human trafficking, terrorism, nuclear smuggling, gambling, 
and prostitution. Organized crime is such an incredibly 
large and pervasive problem that every person has 
inevitably suffered in some way, either directly or 
indirectly, from the negative consequences of organized 
criminal activity.  
Traditionally, organized crimes have been equated with 
drug trafficking. Today, however, evidence shows that this 
pairing is too simple. Organized criminals deal in much 
more than drugs. However, it is well known that drugs are 
still the major business of organized crime syndicates 
throughout the world, generating an estimated $400 billion 
in annual revenue (Office of National, 2000).  
The drug problem has its own cultural, economic, and 
political dynamic. The drug subculture provides norms, 
values, and status to abusers and traffickers. Crime, a 
major reflection of the drug subculture generates 
masculinity and short-term money. In some parts of the 
world, the young could not imagine buying a good car, 
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cellular phone, or a gun without getting into the drug 
business. The drug economy provides the young user with a 
realistic chance of fast living. The production, 
consumption, and trafficking of drugs have emerged as a 
triple threat to sustained economic development throughout 
the world. Drug traffickers corrupt politicians to 
facilitate their job. Furthermore, the drug business is 
used by terrorist organizations to raise funds for their 
illegal activities. Terrorist organizations, with this 
seemingly bottomless source of income, pose even more of a 
threat to both national and international security.  
The drug phenomenon, regardless of its reputation at 
the global, regional, or national level, is not a one-
dimensional matter. Indeed, it is multidimensional both in 
its characteristics and its consequences. Production, 
trafficking, consumption, and money laundering are the four 
primary occupations that are characteristic of the drug 
problem. Each of these individual occupations can produce 
devastating consequences, including economic resource 
depletion, crime, and corruption. In order to understand 
the drug problem, to effectively evaluate efforts to 
eradicate the drug problem, and to produce feasible 
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solutions, both the characteristics and the consequences of 
the drug phenomenon must be understood thoroughly.  
The growth of the drug industry and its concomitant 
real or perceived threats to national authority has given 
much needed rise worldwide to the development of law and 
the organization of crime control. As early as the Shanghai 
Conference in 1909, a step-by-step global effort was 
undertaken to sanction the production and consumption of 
psychotropic substances. Almost every country in the world, 
by ratifying international treaties, has obliged itself to 
adapt its national laws in accordance with these treaties, 
and thereby to suppress the now illegal drug business.  
The United Nations and European Union have paved the 
way for building a global prohibition regime. It was in 
1950’s that the United Nations and several multilateral 
European organizations began their efforts to control the 
drug trade by way of a global, cooperative, anti-drug drug 
regime. This regime is still under construction, and is 
always targeting new drugs and expanding its organizational 
structure. It encompasses multinational organizations, 
state bureaucracies, banks, medical institutions and even 
social morality. Various international conventions and 
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national initiatives have been passed in an attempt to 
establish a framework that can control the drug trade. 
Especially after the 1980s, unilateral, bilateral, and 
multilateral forms of pressure, intervention, and 
collaboration have encouraged governments to comply with 
the global prohibition initiatives and to stifle the growth 
of the drug economy. Conditional development aid packages 
and extradition treaties, anti-money laundering 
regulations, forfeiture laws, financial incentives, 
military and police training assistance, political 
pressure, and even outright military intervention have all 
been used as instruments by the United Nations and European 
Union to encourage countries to fall in line with the 
global prohibition regime. In addition to the use of those 
instruments, institutional structures, such as Interpol, 
Europol, and the UNDCP have been strengthened to intensify 
international cooperation. Besides that, several informal 
structures have developed between the police, military, and 
various intelligence agencies (Anderson, & Boer, 1994; 
Fijnaut, 1993; Marshall, 1991). Many of these are not new. 
Before the end of the Cold War, countries like France and 
the United States had extensive programs for the assistance 
of foreign military and police forces (Fijnaut 1993, 
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Marshall 1991). Such programs have been legitimized by the 
supposed need to strengthen each nation’s ability to fight 
the drug industry. 
Arguments 
Despite the success of some efforts to create a formal 
global anti-drug regime drugs are still a growing problem 
throughout the world. In this study, it is argued that 
there are three major reasons for the increase in the 
illicit drug problem. First, efforts to create an effective 
international criminal justice system to meet the 
challenges of drug trafficking and globalized crime have 
not been successful enough. Despite the existence of a 
formal global drug-prohibition regime created by the United 
Nations, the execution and dedication of control efforts 
are still in the hands of individual governments and state 
agencies. Consequently, the implementation of global 
prohibition measures differs from state to state. Those 
differences hinder the success of the global prohibition 
regime. Second, the drug interests are strong enough to 
hinder the success of the global prohibition regime. Third, 
the anti-drug policies are hindered by corruption.  
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1. The Effects of the Various Practices of the States  
There are many reasons for the differences in anti-drug 
practices from state to state. First, the economic and 
social environments are different from one state to the 
next. Likewise, each nation has its own unique public 
health, privacy, security, and moral concerns. Second, the 
conception of the problem within and between societies and 
the discourses guiding government intervention in the drug 
industry vary widely over time and geographic space. Third, 
the multi-dimensionality of the drug problem makes 
individual countries focus on different aspects of the drug 
problem and the associated drug policies.  
The idea of the creation of a global power to enforce 
the drug prohibition regime is largely legitimized and 
rationalized by the apparent global interdependency of the 
illegal drug industry. However, among national entities, 
interdependency does not necessarily translate to mean 
greater integration or “closer collaboration and 
harmonization.” Interdependency can also be caused by 
“dependency,” “exploitation,” “free riding,” and “conflict” 
due to the uneven distribution of law enforcement 
resources, and international pressure on countries to 
comply with a global legislative, executive, and judicial 
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system (Nichols, 1999). As a result, efforts to make 
nations interdependent conflict with national sovereignties 
and national interests. The privacy and security of the 
countries are to some degree is comprised. This makes 
states less likely to support an international criminal 
justice system, and more likely to dedicate their resources 
to their own criminal justice system.  
Variations in the way each nation perceives the drug 
problem and the actual multi-dimensionality of the drug 
problem makes the individual states intervene in their own 
separate way. Accordingly, for example, while one country 
might concentrate its forces on efforts to prevent drug 
traffickers from using its land as a transport route, 
another country might concentrate its forces on the 
elimination of poppy fields in its lands. Consequently, the 
individual effort to intervene simply diverts trafficking 
routes from one country to another, or transplants poppy 
fields from one country to another. The nationality of the 
drug entrepreneur might change as well, but these efforts 
do nothing to further the cause of the global prohibition 
regime. They do not eliminate the supply and demand for 
drugs throughout the world.  
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2. The Strength of Drug Interests 
Drug interests are strong enough to create a base of 
power that has a great deal of influence on political life 
and economic activities. The efforts of drug entrepreneurs 
to protect their trade, the people whose income depends on 
the drug industry, and the states whose economy benefit 
from the drug trade through the influx of foreign currency 
severely limit the ability of governments to deal with the 
drug industry.  
Other resistance facing the global drug prohibition 
regime comes from the pharmaceutical industries. In order 
to be prepared for war, states must maintain a secure 
supply of anesthetics. This interest, often shields 
pharmaceutical companies from scrutiny. Consequently, 
coaxing governments into compliance with prohibition has 
been, and still is, an arduous process. 
3. Corruption 
The third major factor hindering the global 
prohibition regime is corruption. Since corruption causes 
the selective practice and application of policies, the 
drug war has contaminated national entities with 
corruption. Their efforts just touch upon the distribution 
 118
of wealth between drug dealers, but they do not decrease 
drug crimes.  
Through their relations with drug dealers, police 
officers, and other state protectors, are always exposed to 
corruption by drug dealers. Heavy punishments for drug 
crimes, long sentences and asset forfeiture laws, provide 
huge incentives for drug criminals to corrupt state 
protectors.  
The illegitimate use of illegal violence and authorized 
force to serve the purpose of one class, clan, ethnic 
group, region, or country against another, is not a new 
phenomenon. It is, however, strongly related to the 
dynamics and consequences of the growth of the drug market. 
In many countries, it is exactly the close association 
between criminal groups and power elites that produces and 
prolongs such perverse consequences (Hess, 1986). Many 
examples exist of clandestine cooperations between secret 
services, political parties, or other elite groups and drug 
entrepreneurs. These cooperations are made to repress 
domestic opposition and destabilize foreign governments. 
Industrialized nations, such as France, Italy or the United 
States, and developing countries such as Turkey, South 
Africa, Colombia, or Mexico all have provided examples of 
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corruption at some point in their history (Block, & Hess 
1986, Kruger 1980, McCoy 1972, Scott and Marshall 1991). 
Similarly, many opposition groups, such as the PKK in 
Turkey, have discovered how much monetary support the drug 
trade can provide to their cause. 
To sum up, all these international agreements and 
conventions have been articulated between countries for the 
prevention of international organized crime. The question 
is will these international agreements and conventions work 
or have an impact on organized crime business? The answer 
to this question is that if the countries did not have 
these international agreements and conventions it would be 
sovereignty problem for the countries. It would give the 
impression that powerful countries’ interests and their 
political allies are forcing the weak countries to obey 
their rules. This idea would paralyze progress by 
preventing cooperation between countries and would remove 
any incentive for the rest of the world to cut barriers to 
other aids supplied by the countries ready to help to solve 
the problem. The right incentives are critical, however, to 
ensure that the nations become fully democratic the 
instruments to solve the problem should be met by the 
signers of the agreements. 
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